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Investment Treaty Arbitration in Cuba 
Rafael Cox Alomar* 
Not since the fateful days of the 1962 Missile Crisis, has 
Cuba commanded as much global attention as it does today. 
The 2014 diplomatic rapprochement between the United 
States and Cuba, not only did away with the last vestiges of 
the Cold War in Caribbean waters, but more importantly has 
coincided with a period of acute ideological effervescence in 
Havana. Even in the face of President Raúl Castro’s resolute 
commitment to the principles of the 1959 Revolution, it is 
more than evident that Cuba is in the midst of a transforma-
tional moment. And perhaps in no other area of the island’s 
institutional life are the winds of change as noticeable as in 
Cuba’s new ordre public with respect to Direct Foreign In-
vestment (“DFI”). 
Cuba’s immediate uncertainties, compounded by the rather 
piecemeal unfolding of its economic negotiations with the 
United States, places even more weight on the island’s ca-
pacity to attract and maintain a seamless stream of DFI. The 
quantity and quality of such inflow will, no doubt, depend on 
the credibility and cogency of Cuba’s legal superstructure. 
It is precisely against this background, that this Article pro-
poses an innovative reading of Cuba’s bilateral investment 
treaties (“BITs”), grounded on a comparative legal analysis 
                                                                                                             
* Rafael Cox Alomar is an Assistant Professor at the David A. Clarke School of 
Law in Washington, D.C. 
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that brings to the fore the intense, yet often unexplored, in-
teractions between Cuban law, public international law and 
investment treaty arbitral jurisprudence. 
Part I delineates the substantive elements of Cuba’s Foreign 
Investment Act of 2014, and more generally traces the evo-
lution of Cuba’s legal superstructure since the emergence of 
the empresa mixta. Part II explores the penumbras of the 
dispute settlement mechanisms available in Cuban BITs. 
Part III provides a comprehensive analysis of the standard 
safeguards available to foreign investments and foreign in-
vestors operating in Cuban territory under the protection of 
a BIT. Part IV weighs in, both from a legal and policy per-
spective, on the normative lacunas and structural challenges 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. A Transformative Moment 
Not since the fateful days of the 1962 Missile Crisis, has Cuba 
commanded as much global attention as it does today. The 2014 dip-
lomatic rapprochement between the United States and Cuba,1 not 
only did away with the last vestiges of the Cold War in Caribbean 
waters,2 but more importantly has coincided with a period of acute 
ideological effervescence in Havana. Even in the face of President 
Raúl Castro’s resolute commitment to the principles of the 1959 
Revolution,3 it is more than evident that Cuba is in the midst of a 
                                                                                                             
 1 President Eisenhower cut off diplomatic relations with Cuba on January 3, 
1961. United States severs diplomatic relations with Cuba, HISTORY, 
http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/united-states-severs-diplomatic-rela-
tions-with-cuba. 
 2 Statement by the President on Cuba Policy Changes, WHITE HOUSE (Dec. 
17, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/12/17/statement-pr
esident-cuba-policy-changes. President Obama announced that in changing its re-
lationship with Cuba, the United States “will end an outdated approach that, for 
decades, has failed to advance our interests . . . the relationship between our coun-
tries played out against the backdrop of the Cold War, and America’s steadfast 
opposition to communism.” Id. 
 3 On December 17, 2014, in his response to President Obama’s speech, Pres-
ident Castro said the following words, “since my election as President of the State 
Council and Council of Ministers I have reiterated on many occasions our will-
ingness to hold a respectful dialogue with the United States on the basis of sover-
eign equality . . . [t]his stance was conveyed to the U.S. Government both publicly 
and privately . . . stating the willingness to discuss and solve our differences with-
out renouncing any of our principles.” Foreign Staff, Speech by Cuban President 
Raul Castro on Re-establishing U.S.-Cuba Relations, WASHINGTON POST (Dec. 
17, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/full-text-speech-by-cuban-pr
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transformational moment. And perhaps in no other area of the is-
land’s institutional life are the winds of change as noticeable as in 
Cuba’s new ordre public with respect to Direct Foreign Investment 
(“DFI”). 
It is no secret that Cuba’s sustainability is wholly contingent on 
the decisive expansion of its economy; so far one of Latin America’s 
most sluggish due in no small measure to the United States’ unbend-
ing blockade. During the last decade, Cuba’s GDP has only grown 
1.8% per annum —half the Latin American average.4 Jumpstarting 
the Cuban economy, however, will necessarily require annual 
growth rates of at least 5% to 7%.5 Against this background, no 
growth strategy will succeed in Cuba in the absence of a significant 
and constant inflow of DFI, to the tune of $2.0 and $2.5 billion per 
annum.6 
The recent months, moreover, have brought to bear a renewed 
sense of urgency. Venezuela’s tragic implosion, which in turn has 
forced authorities in Caracas to stop delivering Havana 99,000 daily 
barrels of crude oil, has sent Cuba into a downward spiral.7 During 
                                                                                                             
esident-raul-castro-on-re-establishing-us-cuba-relations/2014/12/17/45bc2f88-8
616-11e4-b9b7-b8632ae73d25_story.html. 
 4 Cuba Foreign Trade, Chamber of Commerce of the Cuban Republic, Jan-
uary 2015. 
 5 Note that the 5% to 7% growth figure was suggested at the extraordinary 
session of the National Assembly of People’s Power where Cuba’s new Foreign 
Investment Act was approved on March 29, 2014, available at http://www.gran
ma.cu/file/pdf/2014/04/16/G_2014041609.pdf. Mark P. Sullivan, Cuba: Issues 
for the 114th Congress, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (July 17, 2015), 
available at https://cri.fiu.edu/us-cuba/policy/cuba-issues-for-114th-congress. 
pdf. 
 6 Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Can Cuba’s Economic Reforms Succeed?, 
AMERICAS QUARTERLY, http://www.americasquarterly.org/content/can-cubas-
economic-reforms-succeed. It is essential to note, however, that the available em-
pirical data appears to show that there is no direct causal link between a capital 
importing country’s success in attracting high levels of DFI and the sheer number 
of investment treaties it signs. An aggressive treaty-signing agenda is but one of 
a myriad of elements impacting a sovereign’s effectiveness in importing foreign 
capital. For an illuminating analysis of these dynamics see Lisa E. Sachs & Karl 
P. Sauvant, THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTME
NT: BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION 
TREATIES AND INVESTMENT FLOWS (Oxford University Press, 2009). 
 7 Franz Von Bergen, Venezuela Cuts Oils Shipments to Cuba Forcing Castro 
to Consider Veering to U.S., FOX NEWS (July 27, 2016), http://latino.foxnews.c
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the first semester of 2016, Cuba’s GDP only grew by 1%—half of 
what the Cuban government had initially projected.8 Not surpris-
ingly, President Raúl Castro has warned the National Assembly of 
People’s Power of tough times ahead.9 
Cuba’s immediate uncertainties, compounded by the rather 
piecemeal unfolding of its economic negotiations with the United 
States, places even more weight on the island’s capacity to attract 
and maintain a seamless stream of DFI. The quantity and quality of 
such inflow will, no doubt, depend on the credibility and cogency of 
Cuba’s legal superstructure. 
B. The Roadmap 
It is precisely against this background, that this Article proposes 
an innovative reading of Cuba’s bilateral investment treaties 
(“BITs”), grounded on a comparative legal analysis that brings to 
the fore the intense, yet often unexplored, interactions between Cu-
ban law, public international law, and BIT arbitral jurisprudence. 
Part I delineates the substantive elements of Cuba’s Foreign Invest-
ment Act of 2014 (“FIA”), and more generally traces the evolution 
of Cuba’s legal superstructure since the emergence of the empresa 
mixta. Part II explores the penumbras of the dispute settlement 
mechanisms available in Cuban BITs. Part III provides a compre-
hensive analysis of the standard safeguards available to foreign in-
vestments and foreign investors operating in Cuban territory under 
the protection of a BIT. Part IV weighs in, both from a legal and 
policy perspective, on the normative lacunas and structural chal-
lenges ingrained in Cuba’s investment treaty landscape. 
                                                                                                             
om/latino/news/2016/07/27/venezuela-cuts-oils-shipments-to-cuba-forcing-cast
ros-to-consider-veer-to-us/. 
 8 Raúl Castro: El pueblo cubano crecerá frente a las dificultades, YOUTUBE 
(July 8, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jOA2vZCBVwo (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2017). 
 9 Id. 
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II. CUBA’S FOREIGN INVESTMENT ACT OF 2014 
A. The Geopolitical Jigsaw Puzzle 
Cuba’s DFI policy has undergone significant, yet slow, change 
throughout the last 40 years. Driven more by sheer necessity than 
choice, the tortuous evolution of Cuba’s approach to DFI cannot be 
divorced from the wider geopolitical imperatives shaping Cuban life 
with ferocious intensity ever since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 
concomitant demise of the Soviet Union. The island’s 2014 FIA is 
but the most recent stride, in a long continuum of discontinuous 
steps, aimed at inserting Cuba to the global economy. Cuba’s obvi-
ous intention to articulate an autochthonous market-economy prem-
ised on the Chinese and Vietnamese hybrid models adds, then, a 
considerable degree of complexity to a process fraught with signifi-
cant uncertainty. 
B. An Evolving Legal Framework 
The first conspicuous attempt at easing the normative rigidity of 
the 1976 Constitution10 came to life with the enactment in 1982 of 
Decree-Law No. 50,11 which brought to life the Cuban empresa 
                                                                                                             
 10 Article 1 of the 1976 Constitution makes it plain clear that “Cuba is a So-
cialist State of workers, independent and sovereign, organized by all and for the 
good of all, as a unified and democratic republic, for the enjoyment of political 
freedom, social justice, individual and collective welfare and human solidarity.” 
More specifically, Article 14 establishes that in Cuba “the economic system is 
based on the people’s socialist ownership of all fundamental means of production 
and on the suppression of all forms of human exploitation.” Article 15, for its part, 
forbids natural or legal persons from holding an ownership interest on land, except 
for small farmers. Such constitutional provision insists that the Cuban subsoil, 
mines, all natural resources, forests, waterways, sugar mills, factories, modes of 
transportation, all nationalized banks, as well as scientific, cultural and sports in-
stallations belong to the Cuban Republic and title over them cannot be transferred 
to natural or legal persons. CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CUBA arts. 1, 14, 
15 (1976), as amended (2002) (CUBA CONST.). 
 11 DECRETO-LEY No. 50 (Cuba 1982). Decree-Law 50 entered into full force 
and effect in Cuba on February 15, 1982 (“Sobre asociación económica entre 
entidades cubanas y extranjeras”). 
2017] INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW 7 
 
mixta, or “joint venture.”12 The unveiling of the empresa mixta re-
sulted from Cuba’s strategic calculus, at the time, to buttress its sag-
ging export and tourism sectors.13 This notwithstanding, the birth of 
the empresa mixta did not do away with the principle of non-trans-
ferability of Cuban property to foreign hands entrenched in the 1976 
Constitution. At most, the Cuban partner of the empresa mixta could 
only convey proprietary rights to its foreign counterparts by means 
of a lease or usufruct.14 
Soon thereafter, the colossal fall of the Communist bloc and the 
brutality of the so-called Cuban special period15 led to a second 
wave of institutional tinkering. This time the reform was of consti-
tutional magnitude.16 It led, inter alia, to the incorporation in 1992 
of both the empresa mixta and the asociaciones económicas into the 
Cuban Constitution.17 Under the newly ratified Article 23,18 the Cu-
ban Republic openly recognized the proprietary rights inherent to 
the empresa mixta and the asociaciones económicas.19 
                                                                                                             
 12 Natacha Mesa Tejeda, “Modalidades de la Inversión Extranjera: La Em-
presa Mixta,” Inversión Extranjera, LA HABANA: INSTITUTO CUBANO DEL LIBRO 
1 (2015) (Cuba). 
 13 Emilio Marill, “Respaldo Constitucional a las Inversiones Extranjeras, 
REVISTA CUBANA DE DERECHO 10, 41 (Dec. 1995) (Cuba). 
 14 Juan Vega Vega, Comentarios a la legislación cubana sobre asociaciones 
económicas con empresarios extranjeros, REVISTA CUBANA DE DERECHO 5, 29-
30 (Mar. 1992) (Cuba). 
 15 Cuba’s special period occurred from 1989 until the late 1990s when Ven-
ezuela’s President Hugo Chávez agreed to supply Cuba’s fuel needs. During these 
years Cuba saw, for example, an alarming collapse of its import activity. In 1993 
alone Cuba imported 75% less than in 1989. Alarming rates of inflation and a 
massive exodus of young Cubans brought economic growth to a halt. 
 16 On October 10, 1991, the Communist Party’s IV Congress opened the door 
for amending the 1976 Constitution. The Party’s directive led the National As-
sembly of People’s Power to ratify, on July 12, 1992, the above-referenced 
amendments to the constitutional text. See Elections and Events 1991-2001, UC 
SAN DIEGO, http://libraries.ucsd.edu/collections/about/collections-of-distinction/l
atin-american-elections-statistics/cuba/elections-and-events-19912001.html (last 
visited Mar. 30). 
 17 CUBA CONST. (amended 2002). 
 18 CUBA CONST. art. 23. (2002) (“El Estado reconoce la propiedad de las em-
presas mixtas, sociedades y asociaciones económicas que se constituyen con-
forme a la ley.”). 
 19 Id. Note that the parties entering into an asociación económica do not lose 
their independent legal personality, as is the case in the empresa mixta model. 
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Both the enactment by Cuban authorities of the 1995 Foreign 
Investment Act20 and their unleashing of an aggressive BIT-drafting 
strategy, which took off in 1993 with the signing of the Cuban-Ital-
ian treaty, stand as the progeny of the 1991-92 unfinished agenda. 
The 2014 Foreign Investment Act,21 thus, is the culmination of a 
long-winded evolutionary process.22 
C. Cuban Foreign Investment Law Today 
Enacted close to nine months before President Obama’s Decem-
ber 2014 speech,23 Cuba’s FIA is in many respects a more refined 
and user-friendly statute than its predecessor. 
As a threshold matter, it is essential to note that the definition of 
“foreign investment” under Article 12 of the FIA includes both di-
rect and indirect investments.24 Thus, indirect ownership of shares 
in a local subsidiary constitutes a “protected investment” under the 
Cuban legislation. Article 13.1, for its part, identifies the three mo-
dalities of foreign investment recognized under Cuban law, namely, 
the joint venture (empresa mixta), the international economic asso-
ciation agreement (contrato de asociación económica internac-
ional), and the totally foreign capital company (empresa de capital 
totalmente extranjero).25 
                                                                                                             
 20 LEY 77 (1995) (Cuba). This statute was enacted on Sept. 5, 1995. 
 21 The 2014 Foreign Investment Act was passed by the National Assembly of 
People’s Power on March 29, 2014, and published in a special issue of the Official 
Gazette of the Cuban Republic on April 16, 2014. It entered into full force and 
effect in Cuba on June 28, 2014. Luis M. Alcalde, Cuba’s New Foreign Invest-
ment Law, KEGLER, BROWN, HILL & RITTER (Aug. 8, 2014), http://www.keglerbr
own.com/publications/cubas-new-foreign-investment-law/. 
 22 By the end of 2014, Cuba was attracting a constant stream of DFI in the 
following sectors: tourism and real estate (52%), energy and mining (11%), in-
dustry (10%), food (5%), transportation (5%), agro-sugar (5%), construction (4%) 
and others (8%). Cuba: Portfolio of Opportunities for Foreign Investment, LA 
HABANA: MINISTERIO DEL COMERCIO EXTERIOR Y LA INVERSIÓN EXTRANJERA, 
12 (2015) (Cuba). 
 23 Statement by the President on Cuba Policy Changes, supra note 2. 
 24 LEY 118 art. 12(b) (2014) (Cuba). Article 12(b) reads as follows, “invest-
ments in equities or other securities or bonds, either public or private, which do 
not fall under the definition of direct investment.” 
 25 At the close of 2014, 50% of all foreign investment in Cuba was organized 
as a joint venture or empresa mixta, 45% as an international economic association 
2017] INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW 9 
 
The empresa mixta, as suggested earlier, is a corporation con-
trolled by foreign and domestic shareholders. The empresa mixta 
will have no legal personality until the filing of its constitutive pub-
lic deed with the Cuban Business Register.26 The FIA also requires 
the public deed include the corporation’s bylaws and copy of the 
government’s authorization to proceed with the given project.27 
Contrary to the 1995 legislation, the FIA does extend the radius 
of action of the contrato de asociación económica internacional to 
new economic sectors such as hotel administration and professional 
services.28 The empresa de capital totalmente extranjero, while also 
required to file a public deed with the Cuban Business Register, has 
no local partners.29 
The FIA explicitly guarantees that the benefits granted to foreign 
investors and their investments in Cuba shall remain unchanged for 
the duration of the period for which they were conceded.30 The FIA 
explicitly authorizes the totally foreign capital company to establish 
offices, branches, and subsidiaries both on Cuban soil and abroad.31 
Similar to the substantive safeguards available in BIT’s, the FIA 
also guarantees the protection and security of the foreign invest-
ment.32 Likewise, the FIA extends foreign investments on Cuban 
soil protection against wrongful expropriations,33 while safeguard-
ing the free transfer of the dividends or profits derived from them.34 
The free transfer protection is further strengthened by the FIA’s 
banking and tax provisions. On the one hand, Article 25.1 estab-
lishes that foreign investors shall be entitled to open bank accounts 
                                                                                                             
agreement and 5% as a totally foreign capital company. Cuba: Portfolio of Op-
portunities for Foreign Investment, supra note 22, at 12. 
 26 LEY 118 art. 14.1(6) (2014) (Cuba). 
 27 Id. at art. 14.1(4). 
 28 Cuba Foreign Trade, supra note 4, at 10. 
 29 LEY 118 art. 16.1(2) (Cuba). 
 30 Id. at art. 3. 
 31 Id. at art.1.1(3). 
 32 Id. at art. 4.1. 
 33 Id. 
 34 LEY 118 art. 9.1 (Cuba). 
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in any banking institution belonging to Cuba’s National Bank Sys-
tem.35 On the other, Article 35 exempts the foreign investor from 
personal tax liability for profits or dividends.36 
In Cuba all foreign investment projects require governmental au-
thorization. Admittedly, this amounts to a highly centralized state-
driven process conducted at the highest echelons of the Cuban Re-
public. Depending on the nature of the project and the economic 
sector involved, the foreign investor will be required to seek author-
ization either from the Council of State37 or the Council of Minis-
ters.38 
Council of State approval is required for all foreign investment 
projects intending to explore or exploit non-renewable natural re-
sources; run the most essential public services in the transportation, 
communications, water or power sectors; construct public works; 
and/or exploit a public good.39 
Council of Ministers authorization, furthermore, is required 
whenever the foreign investment project touches upon a real estate 
development; the transfer of state proprietary rights; a risk agree-
ment for the exploitation of non-renewable natural resources; the 
participation of a foreign company partly financed by state funds; 
                                                                                                             
 35 Id. at art. 25.1. 
 36 Id. at art. 35. 
 37 Note that the 1976 Constitution redesigned Cuba’s governmental architec-
ture, ratifying the island’s definitive abandonment of the traditional republican 
form of government. A National Assembly of People’s Power (Asamblea 
Nacional del Poder Popular) was now erected as the “supreme organ” of the Cu-
ban Republic. Elected to 5-year terms, the deputies of the National Assembly of 
People’s Power select from among their peers the members of the Council of 
State. The 1976 Constitution designates the president of the Council of State as 
head of state of the Republic and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The 
Council of State has authority to, inter alia, enact decree-laws; render legally 
binding opinions on all applicable laws; declare war in case of aggression; ratify 
and denounce international treaties; and designate and remove ambassadors. 
CUBA CONST. arts. 69, 72 (2002). 
 38 The membership of the Council of Ministers is chosen by the President of 
the Council of State, who sits as its President. Among the Council of Ministers’ 
attributions are the following: conduct the foreign relations and the foreign trade 
of the Republic; sign international treaties; prepare the budget; and regulate the 
Republic’s monetary policy. Id. at art. 98. 
 39 LEY 118 art. 21.1(2) (a-b) (Cuba). 
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the use of renewable energy; the management of healthcare, educa-
tion and defense institutions; and all other foreign investments not 
requiring Council of State approval.40 
Of significance is the fact that the dispute settlement mechanism 
included in the FIA is considerably narrow in scope. Article 60.1 
establishes that, 
[t]he conflicts which may arise in the relationship be-
tween the partners of a joint venture or between na-
tional and foreign investors, which are parties to in-
ternational economic association agreements, or be-
tween partners of a totally foreign capital company 
in the form of a corporation with registered shares, 
shall be resolved as agreed in the constituent docu-
ments, except in the cases referred to in this Chap-
ter.41 
Excepted from arbitration under the FIA are those disputes aris-
ing in connection to the winding up, dissolution, termination and 
inactivity of the governing bodies of a joint venture, an international 
economic association, or a totally foreign capital company.42 The 
Economic Division of the corresponding Cuban Provincial Court 
has exclusive jurisdiction over these conflicts.43 Similarly, disputes 
arising in the relationship between the partners of a joint venture, a 
totally foreign capital company, or an international economic asso-
ciation agreement with authorization to develop an investment pro-
ject related to natural resources, public services, and/or public 
works, also fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Economic Di-
vision of the relevant Provincial Court.44 Moreover, litigation over 
the parties’ performance of their respective obligations under the 
joint venture, the totally foreign capital company, or the interna-
tional economic association agreement can proceed either before the 
Economic Division of the corresponding Cuban Provincial Court or 
                                                                                                             
 40 Id. at art. 21.1(3) (a-h). 
 41 Id. at art. 60.1 (emphasis added). 
 42 Id. at art. 60.1(3). 
 43 Id. at art. 60.1(3). 
 44 LEY 118 art. 60.1(4). 
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before an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Cuban do-
mestic law.45 
Contrary to, for instance, the Albanian or Salvadorian foreign 
investment statutes,46 both of which openly offer consent to invest-
ment treaty arbitration, Cuba’s FIA does not bestow on the foreign 
investor standing to elevate an international arbitral claim against 
the Cuban Republic.47 Cuba’s consent to investment treaty arbitra-
tion, as shall be seen below, is to be found in its vast corpus of bi-
lateral investment treaties. 
III. SETTLING INVESTMENT TREATY DISPUTES WITH THE CUBAN 
REPUBLIC 
A. Consent to Investment Treaty Arbitration 
In the context of investment treaty arbitration, no other threshold 
question is as essential as the sovereign’s consent to appear before 
the arbitral tribunal. More often than not, sovereigns offer their con-
sent to arbitration by any of the following three channels: domestic 
legislation, specific contractual arrangements with foreign inves-
tors, or through bilateral or multilateral investment treaties with the 
foreign investors’ country of origin.48 While Chapter XVII (Conflict 
                                                                                                             
 45 Id. at art. 61. 
 46 Law No. 7764 art. 8 (1993) (Alb.); LEY DE INVERSIONES, art. 15 (1999) (El 
Sal.). For a rendition on the breadth of the Albanian and Salvadorean foreign in-
vestment statutes refer to Tradex Hellas S.A. v. Republic of Albania, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/94/2, Decision on Jurisdiction, 173-4 (Dec. 24, 1996); and Inceysa Val-
lisoletana, S.L. v. El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26, Award, 331-32 (Aug. 
2, 2006), respectively. 
 47 See Narciso Cobo Roura, Conflictos e Inversión Extranjera: Un Comenta-
rio, INVERSIÓN EXTRANJERA LA HABANA: INSTITUTO CUBANO DEL LIBRO, 155 
(2015) (Cuba). 
 48 See Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International In-
vestment Law 2d edition, 254-64 (Oxford University Press 2012) (for a general 
discussion of the various procedural modalities for tendering consent); Menzies 
Middle East and Africa S.A. et. al. v. République du Sénégal, ICSID Case No. 
ARB 15/21, Award, ¶ 130 (Aug. 5, 2016) (“un Etat souverain ne peut pas être 
assujetti à une jurisdiction internationale sans son consentement clairement ex-
primé et non-équivoque.”); M.C.I. Power Group L.C. and New Turbine, INC. v. 
Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/6, Award, ¶ 323 (July 31, 2007) 
(“Under general international law, any obligation to submit for arbitration a dis-
pute involving a State requires the existence of an agreement. That agreement, 
2017] INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW 13 
 
Resolution) of Cuba’s FIA does contain a dispute settlement mech-
anism, it does not grant foreign investors carte blanche to sue Cuba 
before international tribunals.49 Cuba’s consent to investment treaty 
arbitration,50 however, is found in the multitude of BITs it has en-
tered into since 1993. The catalogue of Cuban BITs is incredibly 
diverse. So far, Cuba has signed investment treaties with, inter alia, 
Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Belgium-
Luxembourg, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Cape Verde, 
Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, 
                                                                                                             
which may be verbal, must be proven by the party alleging it.”). Of relevance is 
the fact that there appears to be a discrepancy among arbitral tribunals on whether 
to apply the heightened “clear and unambiguous” standard or the more liberal 
yardstick of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(ratified by Cuba on Sept. 9, 1998) in determining the existence of an arbitration 
agreement. See Quasar de Valors SICAV S.A. et al. (Formerly Renta 4 S.V.S.A et 
al.) v. Russian Federation, SCC Case No. 24/2007, Separate Opinion of Charles 
N. Brower, ¶ 7 (Mar. 20 2009) (for an overview of this debate), Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties art. 31-32, ratified by Cuba on Sept. 9, 1998, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 33. Also see Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 198 (Feb. 8, 2005). 
 49 LEY 118 Chapter XVII (Cuba). 
 50 Cuba’s legal culture is no stranger to arbitration. The 1855 Spanish Law of 
Civil Procedure, extended to Cuba in 1866, drew a distinction between judges and 
arbitrators and did enable the parties to choose arbitration as their dispute settle-
ment mechanism. See Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil de España, islas de Cuba y 
Puerto Rico, Madrid: Librería de la Viuda e Hijos de D.J. Cuesta, 398-412 (1867). 
It is essential to note, moreover, that the Spanish legislation applicable to Cuba 
during the colonial period was heavily influenced, inter alia, by the Siete Partidas, 
which as early as the 13th century did provide for the appointment of arbitrators 
and comunales amigos to resolve disputes within the terms of reference agreed by 
the parties. See 3d Partida art. I (Que habla de la justicia, de cómo se ha de hacer 
ordenadamente en todo lugar, por palabra de juicio y por obra de hecho). See 
Madaline W. Nichols, Las Siete Partidas, 20 CAL. L. REV. 260, 273-6 (1932) (for 
a relevant reading of the 3rd Partida). See DECRETO-LEY 250 (Cuba) (which estab-
lished the Cuban Court of International Commercial Arbitration, the successor to 
the old Cuban Arbitration Court for Foreign Trade, or Corte Cubana de Arbitraje 
de Comercio Exterior, created under Law No. 1148 of September 15, 1965 as an 
organ of the Cuban Chamber of Commerce). See also RESOLUTION No. 15 (Cuba). 
Of significance is the fact that Cuba ratified the Geneva Convention on Interna-
tional Commercial Arbitration as early as January 7, 1964 and similarly acceded 
to the New York Convention on December 30, 1974 --- which entered into full 
force and effect on Cuban soil on March 30, 1975. European Convention on In-
ternational Commercial Arbitration (Apr. 21, 1961) 
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Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Indonesia, Italy, Jamaica, Laos, Leb-
anon, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, the 
Netherlands, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, 
Russia, San Marino, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Suriname, Swit-
zerland, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United 
Kingdom, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia, and Angola.51 With 62 
BITs in full force and effect around the world,52 and in light of the 
ever increasing volumes of DFI reaching its shores, time is of the 
essence for scrutinizing the legal depth and breadth of Cuba’s in-
vestment treaties. 
While dissimilar in linguistic structure and choice of words, the 
consent language included in the various Cuban treaties offers the 
foreign investor doing business in Cuba the possibility of elevating 
to the international plane his or her legal claim against the Cuban 
Republic. Binding and unequivocal, Cuban consent is not premised 
on the foreign investor’s arbitrary fulfillment of conditions prece-
dent.53 Article 9(4)of the Cuba-Netherlands BIT, for instance, 
openly provides that “[e]ach Contracting Party hereby consents to 
submit investment disputes for resolution to the alternative dispute 
settlement fora mentioned in the preceding paragraphs.”54 Similarly, 
Article 10(2) of the Cuba-Greece BIT explicitly suggests that 
“[e]ach Contracting Party hereby consents to the submission of such 
                                                                                                             
 51 Investment Policy Hub, UNITED NATIONS UNCTAD, http://investmentpol-
icyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/52 (last visited Mar. 30). 
 52 According to Professor Juan Mendoza Díaz, Cuba has entered into 63 
BITs, of which 62 are in force today. Only the treaty with Ecuador is no longer in 
effect, due to the Ecuadorian government’s 2008 denunciation. Unsurprisingly, a 
sizeable proportion of Cuban BITs came to life during the so-called special period, 
following the decisive demise of the communist bloc. See Juan Mendoza Díaz, 
Cuba y el Arbitraje de Inversión, Un Tema Insoslayable, INVERSIÓN 
EXTRANJERA LA HABANA: INSTITUTO CUBANO DEL LIBRO, 167-8 (2015). See also 
Mendoza Díaz, Arbitraje de Inversión: Una mirada desde Cuba, REVISTA 
CUBANA DE DERECHO 39, 14-15 (2012). 
 53 See generally LEY 18 (Cuba). 
 54 Under the Cuba-Netherlands BIT, the available arbitral fora are the ICC 
Court of International Arbitration and an ad hoc arbitral tribunal under the proce-
dural rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL). Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of In-
vestments between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of Cuba, 
Cuba-Neth., art. 9(4), Nov. 2, 1999 [hereinafter Cuba-Netherlands BIT]. 
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dispute to international arbitration.”55 On equal terms, Article 9(3) 
of Cuba’s treaty with Romania establishes that “[e]ach Contracting 
Party hereby consents to the submission of an investment dispute to 
international conciliation or arbitration.”56 Even more forcefully, 
Article 12(1) of the Cuba-Austria BIT states in no uncertain terms 
that “[e]ach Contracting Party hereby gives its unconditional con-
sent to the submission of a dispute to international arbitration….”57 
Article 8(2) of the Cuban-Chilean treaty incorporates the Cuban-
Austrian approach, suggesting that “cada Parte Contratante da su 
consentimiento anticipado e irrevocable para que toda diferencia 
pueda ser sometida a este arbitraje.”58  This notwithstanding, the 
immense majority of Cuban BITs offer consent to arbitration by 
means of more succinct phrases, such as the ‘foreign investor “shall 
be entitled,”59 “may submit,”60 “podrá remitir,”61  
                                                                                                             
 55 Agreement between the Government of the Hellenic Republic (of Greece) 
and the Government of the Republic of Cuba on the Promotion and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investments, Cuba-Greece, art. 10(2), June 18, 1996 [hereinafter 
Cuba-Greece BIT]. 
 56 Agreement between the Government of Romania and the Government of 
the Republic of Cuba on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, 
Cuba-Rom., art. 9(3), Jan. 27, 1996 [hereinafter Cuba-Romania BIT]. 
 57 Agreement between the Republic of Austria and the Republic of Cuba for 
the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Cuba-Austria, art. 12(1), May 19, 
2000 [hereinafter Cuba-Austria BIT]. 
 58 Agreement between the Republic of Chile and the Republic of Cuba for 
the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Cuba-Chile, art. 8(2), 
Jan. 10, 1996 [hereinafter Cuba-Chile BIT]. Roughly translates to “[e]ach Con-
tracting Party gives its irrevocable advance consent for any dispute to be submit-
ted to this arbitration.” 
 59 See art. 8(2) of the Agreement between the Republic of Hungary and the 
Republic of Cuba for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, 
Cuba-Hung., Oct. 22, 1999 [hereinafter Cuba-Hungary BIT]; art. 8(2) of the 
Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government 
of the Republic of Cuba for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Invest-
ments, Cuba-Slovk., Mar. 22, 1997 [hereinafter Cuba-Slovakia BIT]. 
 60 Agreement Between The Lebanese Republic and the Republic of Cuba On 
The Promotion and Reciprocal Protection Of Investments, Leb-Cuba. art. 7(2), 
Dec. 14, 1995, I.C.S.I.D. [hereinafter Cuba-Lebanon BIT]. 
 61 Agreement Between The Republic of Guatemala and the Republic of Cuba 
On The Promotion and Reciprocal Protection Of Investments, Guat.-Cuba., art. 
VIII(2), Aug. 20, 1999, I.C.S.I.D. [hereinafter Cuba-Guatemala BIT]; See also 
Agreement Between The Republic of Bolivia and the Republic of Cuba On The 
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“podrá someter,”62 “poderá submeter”63 the dispute to investment 
treaty arbitration.’ Other grammatical constructions include the use 
of phrases such as, the dispute “shall be submitted,”64 “can be sub-
mitted,”65 “será sometida,”66 “podrá ser sometida,”67 il est 
soumis  . . .  à l’arbitrage,”68 “être soumis à l’arbitrage interna-
tional,”69  
                                                                                                             
Promotion and Reciprocal Protection Of Investments, Bol.-Cuba., art. VIII(2), 
May. 6, 1995, I.C.S.I.D. [hereinafter Cuba-Bolivia BIT]. 
 62 Agreement Between The Republic of Mexico and the Republic of Cuba On 
The Promotion and Reciprocal Protection Of Investments, Mex.-Cuba., art. 4(1), 
May. 30, 2001, I.C.S.I.D. [hereinafter Cuba-Mexico BIT]. 
 63 Agreement Between The Republic of Portugal And the Republic of Cuba 
On The Promotion and Reciprocal Protection Of Investments, Port.-Cuba., art. 
9(2), Jul. 8, 1998, I.C.S.I.D. [hereinafter Cuba-Portugal BIT]. 
 64 Agreement Between The Republic of Indonesia and the Republic of Cuba 
On The Promotion And Reciprocal Protection Of Investments, Indon.-Cuba., art. 
VIII(2), Sept. 19, 1992, I.C.S.I.D. [hereinafter Cuba-Indonesia BIT]; Republic of 
Spain and the Republic of Cuba On The Promotion and Reciprocal Protection Of 
Investments, Spain-Cuba., art. XI(2), May. 27, 1994, I.C.S.I.D. [hereinafter Cuba-
Spain BIT]; Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the Republic of Cuba On The Pro-
motion and Reciprocal Protection Of Investments, Viet.-Cuba., art. 8(2), Oct. 12, 
1995, I.C.S.I.D. [hereinafter Cuba-Vietnam BIT]; The United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Republic of Cuba On The Promotion and 
Reciprocal Protection Of Investments Gr. Brit.-Cuba., art. 8(1), Jan. 30, 1995, 
I.C.S.I.D. [hereinafter Cuba-United Kingdom BIT]; Barbados and the Republic 
of Cuba On The Promotion and Reciprocal Protection Of Investments Gr. Brit.-
Cuba., art. 8(1), Feb. 19, 1996, I.C.S.I.D. [hereinafter Cuba-Barbados BIT]. 
 65 Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Cuba On The Promotion and Re-
ciprocal Protection Of Investments Turk.-Cuba., art. VI(2), Dec. 22, 1997, 
I.C.S.I.D. [hereinafter Cuba-Turkey BIT]. 
 66 Republic of Venezuela and the Republic of Cuba On The Promotion and 
Reciprocal Protection Of Investments Venez.-Cuba., art. 9(1), Dec. 11, 1996, 
I.C.S.I.D. [hereinafter Cuba-Venezuela BIT]. 
 67 Republic of Argentina and the Republic of Cuba On The Promotion And 
Reciprocal Protection Of Investments Arg.-Cuba., art. 9(2), Nov. 30, 1995, 
I.C.S.I.D. [hereinafter Cuba-Argentina BIT]. 
 68 French Republic and the Republic of Cuba On The Promotion and Recip-
rocal Protection Of Investments Fr.-Cuba., art. 10, Apr. 25, 1997, I.C.S.I.D. [here-
inafter Cuba-France BIT]. 
 69 Swiss Confederation and the Republic of Cuba On The Promotion and Re-
ciprocal Protection Of Investments Switz.-Cuba., art. 10(1), June 28, 1996, 
I.C.S.I.D. [hereinafter Cuba-Switzerland BIT]. 
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“essa potrà essere sottoposta a scelta dell’investitore,”70 among 
others. 
B. Amicable Settlement and Notice of Claim 
Besides proving Cuba’s consent to international arbitration, the 
foreign investor raising a BIT claim against Cuba will also have to 
adhere to the various and dissimilar procedural requirements found 
in most Cuban investment treaties. 
First and foremost, Cuba’s BITs, almost invariably, require that 
the foreign investor and the Cuban Republic attempt to amicably 
settle their dispute before resorting to domestic litigation or invest-
ment treaty arbitration.71 Article 10(1) of the Cuba-Greece BIT man-
dates that “[d]isputes  . . .  shall, if possible, be settled by the disput-
ing parties in an amicable way.”72 Article 9(1) of the treaty with the 
Netherlands also directs that “[d]isputes  . . .  shall, whenever possi-
ble, be settled amicably between the parties concerned.”73 Likewise, 
the treaties with the United Kingdom and Barbados explicitly com-
mand that only disputes “which have not been amicably settled”74 
shall be submitted to arbitration. The Cuba-Italy BIT reproduces the 
                                                                                                             
 70 Republic of Italy and the Republic of Cuba On The Promotion and Recip-
rocal Protection Of Investments It.-Cuba., art. 10(2), May. 7, 1993, I.C.S.I.D. 
[hereinafter Cuba-Italy BIT]. 
 71 There appears to be a consensus among international arbitral tribunals sug-
gesting that the requirement of friendly consultations is procedural, as opposed to 
jurisdictional, in nature. See, for instance, République D’Italie v. République de 
Cuba, Arbitrage Ad’Hoc, Sentence Preliminaire, 15 mars, 2005, ¶ 75 (“[L]e Tri-
bunal Arbitral estime que le non-respect par la République d’Italie de la lettre de 
l’Article 10(2) de l’Accord ne justifie pas que sa demande d’arbitrage soit décla-
rée irrecevable [ . . . ].”) Also see Teinver S.A. et. al. v. The Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/09/1, Decision on Jurisdiction, December 21, 2012, ¶ 108 
(“The Tribunal agrees with Claimants that Article X(1) [of the Argentina-Spain 
BIT] can fairly be interpreted as a general ‘best efforts’ obligation for the parties 
to attempt to amicably settle their dispute.”) Note, moreover, that Cuba’s partici-
pation in friendly consultations with a foreign investor would not preclude it from 
objecting to the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction once the arbitration proceeding is 
instituted. See, e.g., Sociedad Anónima Eduardo Vieira v. Republic of Chile, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/04/7, Award, August 21, 2007, ¶ 200. 
 72 Cuba-Greece BIT, supra note 55, at art. 10(1). 
 73 Cuba-Netherlands BIT, supra note 54, at art. 9(1). 
 74 See Cuba-United Kingdom BIT, supra note 64, at art. 8(1); see also Bar-
bados-Cuba BIT, supra note 64 at art. 8(1). 
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same principle, “[l]e controversie  . . .  dovranno, per quanto pos-
sibile, essere risolte amichevolmente fra le parti in causa.”75 
Most Cuban BITs set specific timetables for the unfolding of the 
friendly consultations.76 Under the overwhelming majority of these 
treaties, the consultation window remains open for six months from 
the date the foreign investor notifies the Cuban authorities of his or 
her claim,77 although shorter periods of three months are not uncom-
mon.78 The absence of a negotiated settlement, at the end of the con-
sultation period, triggers the treaty’s dispute settlement mechanism. 
The Cuban treaties are far from homogenous with respect to the 
tendering of proper notice.79 While some require the foreign investor 
                                                                                                             
 75 See Cuba-Italy BIT, supra note 70, at art. 9(1). Roughly translates to “[t] 
he dispute . . . shall, as far as possible, be settled amicably between the parties.” 
 76 There is a long line of arbitral authority supporting the proposition that 
failure to comply with the friendly consultations requirement does not lead to a 
finding of lack of jurisdiction. See, for instance, Mohammad Ammar Al-Bahloul 
v. Republic of Tajikistan, SCC Case No. V (064/2008), Partial Award on Jurisdic-
tion and Liability, September 2, 2009, ¶ 156 (“[ . . . ] even if Claimant failed to 
comply with the three-month period, it does not affect the Tribunal’s jurisdiction 
or the admissibility of the claims brought by Claimant.”) Also see to Lauder v. 
The Czech Republic, Ad Hoc Arbitration, Final Award, September 3, 2001, ¶ 187 
(“[ . . . ] this requirement of a six-month waiting period . . . is not a jurisdictional 
provision . . . but a procedural rule that must be satisfied by the Claimant.”) There 
exists, however, arbitral authority to the contrary. See e.g., Enron Corporation 
and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/3, Decision on Jurisdiction, January 14, 2004, ¶ 88 (“[ . . . ] the conclu-
sion reached is not because the six-month negotiation period could be a procedural 
and not a jurisdictional requirement [ . . . ]. Such requirement is in the view of the 
Tribunal very much a jurisdictional one. A failure to comply with that requirement 
would result in a determination of lack of jurisdiction.”) 
 77 See Cuba-France BIT, supra note 68, at art. 10; Cuba- Romania BIT, supra 
note 56, at art. 9(2); Cuba-Lebanon BIT, supra note 60, at art. 7(2); Cuba-Bolivia 
BIT, supra note 61, at art. IX(2); Cuba-Hungary BIT, supra note 59, at art. 8(2); 
Cuba-Portugal BIT, supra note 63, at art. 9(2); Cuba-Germany BIT art. 11(2); 
Cuba-Indonesia BIT, supra note 64, at art. VIII(2); Cuba- Spain BIT, supra note 
64, at art. XI(2); Cuba-Peru BIT art. 8(2); Cuba-Turkey BIT, supra note 65, at art. 
VI(2); Cuba-Argentina BIT, supra note 67, at art. 9(2); Cuba-Greece BIT, supra 
note 55, at art. 10(2); Cuba-Slovakia BIT art. 8(2). 
 78 See Cuba-Switzerland BIT, supra note 69, at art. 10(1); Cuba-Barbados 
BIT, supra note 64, at art. 8(1); Cuba-United Kingdom BIT, supra note 64, at art. 
8(1); Cuba-Guatemala BIT, supra note 61, at art. VIII(2); Cuba-Chile BIT, supra 
note 58, at art. 8(2). 
 79 Note that a considerable number of international arbitral tribunals have 
found that absence of proper notice “does not, in and of itself, affect the Tribunal’s 
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submits the Cuban authorities a written notification,80 along with a 
detailed report of grievances,81 others remain silent as to the execu-
tion of specific formalities.82 
C. Selecting the Proper Forum 
The uneventful expiration of the period of amicable consulta-
tions grants the foreign investor standing to formally submit the dis-
pute to the relevant adjudicatory body. The typical Cuban BIT al-
lows the foreign investor to select the legal forum where to litigate 
the claim, from among the following three choices: namely the com-
petent Cuban domestic court,83 the Court of International Arbitra-
tion of the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris (“ICC”), 
and an international ad hoc arbitral tribunal under the procedural 
rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(“UNCITRAL”).84 The dispute settlement menu of Cuba’s BITs, 
                                                                                                             
jurisdiction.” See Western NIS Enterprise Fund v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/04/2, Order, March 16, 2006, ¶ 7. 
 80 See Cuba’s BIT’s inter alia Cuba-United Kingdom BIT, supra note 64, at 
art. 8(1); Cuba-Barbados BIT, supra note 64, at art. 8(1); Cuba-Italy BIT, supra 
note 70, at art. 9(2); Cuba-Vietnam BIT art. 8(2); Cuba-Lebanon BIT, supra note 
60, at art. 7(2); Cuba-Mexico BIT, supra note 62, at art. 4(1); Cuba-Indonesia 
BIT, supra note 64, at art. VIII(2). 
 81 Cuba–Turkey BIT, supra note 65, at art. VI(1) (“shall be notified in writ-
ing, including a [sic.] detailed information”); Cuba–Spain BIT, supra note 64, at 
art. XI(1) (“shall be communicated in writing, together with a detailed report by 
the investor to the Contracting Party in whose territory the investment was 
made.”). 
 82 See Cuba’s BIT’s with, inter alia, Cuba-Venezuela BIT, supra note 66, at 
art. 9(1); Cuba-Austria BIT, supra note 57, at art. 11(1); Cuba-Chile BIT, supra 
note 58, at art. 8(1); Cuba-Guatemala BIT, supra note 61, at art. VIII(2); Cuba-
Romania BIT, supra note 56, at art. 9(1); Cuba-Bolivia BIT, supra note 61, at art. 
IX(1); Cuba-Hungary BIT, supra note 59, at art. 8(2); Cuba-Portugal BIT, supra 
note 63, at art. 9(2); Cuba-Germany BIT, supra note 77, at art. 11(2); Cuba-Peru 
BIT art. 8(2); Cuba-Greece BIT, supra note 55, at art. 10(2); Cuba-Argentina BIT, 
supra note 67, at art. 9(2); Cuba-Slovakia BIT, supra note 59, art. 8(2); Cuba-
Netherlands BIT, supra note 54, at art. 9(2). 
 83 Arbitration and Mediation: Impartial Forums to Resolve International 
Commercial Disputes in Cuba, Assoc. Study Cuban Econ., available at 
http://www.ascecuba.org/asce_proceedings/arbitration-mediation-impartial-fo-
rums-resolve-international-commercial-disputes-cuba/, (Nov. 30, 2010) (last vis-
ited Feb. 22, 2017). 
 84 See e.g., Cuba-Netherlands BIT, supra note 54, at art. 9(2); Cuba-Guate-
mala BIT, supra note 61, at art. VIII(2); Cuba-Greece BIT, supra note 55, at art. 
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however, is not homogenous. Under Article 10 of the Cuba-France 
BIT, for instance, the only forum available to the foreign investor is 
an ad hoc UNCITRAL tribunal.85 Likewise, Article 11 of the Cuba-
Germany BIT makes it clear that the only option available to the 
aggrieved foreign investor is an ad hoc arbitral tribunal under the 
procedural rules of its own choosing.86 Somewhat similarly, the Cu-
ban-Italian treaty also offers the foreign investor the possibility of 
submitting the dispute to an ad hoc arbitral tribunal,87 but differently 
from Cuba’s agreement with Germany, it does leave the door open 
to domestic litigation before Cuban courts.88 
Cuba’s treaties with Argentina, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Peru, 
like their German and Italian counterparts, leave the foreign investor 
free to choose between a Cuban domestic court and an international 
arbitral tribunal, with the caveat that the former ones explicitly des-
ignate the UNCITRAL arbitration rules as the lex arbitri.89 Interest-
ingly, the Cuban-Lebanese and the Cuban-Romanian treaties, while 
also showing a distinct preference for the UNCITRAL arbitration 
rules, adopt a more deferential approach to the autonomy of the par-
ties; designating them as lex arbitri “unless otherwise agreed upon 
by the parties to the dispute.”90 The treaty with Chile takes this ap-
proach a step further, leaving it entirely to the parties to choose be-
                                                                                                             
10(2); Cuba-Portugal BIT, supra note 63, at art. 9(2); Cuba-Austria BIT, supra 
note 57, at art. 11(1); Cuba-Spain BIT, supra note 64, at art. XI(2); Cuba-Indone-
sia BIT, supra note 64, at art. VIII(2). 
 85 Cuba-France BIT, supra note 68, at art. 10. (“l’arbitrage d’un tribunal ad 
hoc établi conformément au réglement d’arbitrage de la Commission des Nations 
Unies pour le droit commercial international (CNUDCI).”). 
 86 See also, Cuba-Germany BIT, supra note 77, at art. 10(5). (“Im übrigen 
regelt das Schiedsgericht sein Verfahren selbst.”) 
 87 Cuba-Italy BIT, supra note 70, at art.10(5). (“Il Tribunale Arbitrale stabi-
lirà le propie modalità di procedura.”). 
 88 Id. at art 9(2)(a). (“A tribunale competente, nei suoi, successivi gradi, della 
Parte Contraente sul cui territorio è sorta la controversia.”). 
 89 Cuba-Argentina BIT, supra note 67, at art. 9(3)); Cuba-Venezuela BIT, 
supra note 66, at art. 9(3); Cuba-Bolivia BIT, supra note 61, at art. IX(2)(b); 
Cuba-Peru BIT, supra note 77, at art. 8(2)(b); Cuba-Vietnam BIT, supra note 64, 
at art. 8(2)(b). 
 90 Cuba-Lebanon BIT, supra note 60, at art. 7(2)(b); Cuba-Romania BIT, su-
pra note 56, at art. 9(2)(b). 
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tween an international arbitral tribunal, under the UNCITRAL arbi-
tration rules, and a completely ad hoc arbitral tribunal with authority 
to adopt the lex arbitri of its choice.91 
The ICC remains, however, the preferred arbitral forum for most 
foreign investors operating in Cuba;92 not surprisingly, a considera-
ble number of Cuban BITs do provide for ICC arbitration.93 
Of seminal significance, moreover, is the fact that despite its 
long-standing antipathy to the World Bank, and its organs, Cuba’s 
BITs with Mexico94 and Switzerland95 do leave the door wide open, 
pending the agreement of the parties, to the use of the Additional 
Facility Rules (“Additional Facility Rules”) adopted by the Interna-
tional Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes between 
States and Nationals of Other States (“ICSID”).96 Equally im-
portantly, in its treaties with Austria,97 Germany,98 Portugal,99 
                                                                                                             
 91 Cuba-Chile BIT, supra note 58, at art. 8(2)(b)(c). 
 92 Professor Mendoza Díaz suggests that the immense majority of Cuban in-
vestor state arbitrations have been submitted to the ICC. Mendoza Díaz, Cuba y 
el Arbitraje de Inversión, Un Tema Insoslayable, INVERSIÓN EXTRANJERA LA 
HABANA: INSTITUTO CUBANO DEL LIBRO, 169 (2015). Also refer to Mendoza 
Díaz, Arbitraje de Inversión: Una mirada desde Cuba, REVISTA CUBANA DE 
DERECHO 39, 16 (2012) (Cuba). 
 93 See Cuba-Greece BIT, supra note 55, at art. 10(3)(a); Cuba-Netherlands 
BIT, supra note 54, at art. 9(2)(b); Cuba-Spain BIT, supra note 64, at art. XI(2); 
Cuba-Indonesia BIT, supra note 64, at art. VIII(3)(i); Cuba-Hungary BIT, supra 
note 59, at art. 8(2)(a); Cuba-Guatemala BIT, supra note 61, at art.VIII(2)(c); 
Cuba-Mexico BIT, supra note 62, at Appendix art. 4(1)(c); Cuba-Turkey BIT, 
supra note 65, at art. VI(2)(b); Cuba-Switzerland BIT, supra note 69, at art. 
10(2)(b); Cuba-Portugal BIT, supra note 63, at art. 9(2)(b); Cuba-United King-
dom BIT, supra note 64, at art. 8(2)(a); Cuba-Barbados BIT, supra note 64, at art. 
8(2)(a); Cuba-Austria BIT, supra note 57, at art. 11(1)(c)(ii). 
 94 Cuba-Mexico BIT, supra note 62, App. art. 4(1)(d). 
 95 Cuba-Switzerland BIT, supra note 69, at art. 10(2)(a). Mécanisme sup-
plémentaire pour l’administration de procédures de conciliation, d’arbitrage et 
de constatation des faits. 
 96 The Additional Facility Rules, adopted in 1978 by ICSID’s Administrative 
Council, see RUDOLF DOLZER, CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, Principles of International 
Investment Law 240 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2d ed. 2012). see also 
CHRISTOPH SCHREUER (ed.), The ICSID Convention: A Commentary 147-48 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2d ed. 2009). 
 97 See Ad art. 11, Protocol incorporated to Cuba-Austria BIT. 
 98 See Ad art. 11, Protocol incorporated to Cuba-Germany BIT. 
 99 See Ad art. 9(2), Protocol incorporated to Cuba-Portugal BIT. 
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France,100 the Netherlands,101 Hungary,102 Turkey,103 Guatemala,104 
Venezuela,105 and Peru,106 Cuba has agreed to the incorporation of 
binding protocols enabling foreign investors to submit to ICSID 
their investment treaty claims against the Cuban Republic, provided 
Cuba were to, in future, become a contracting party to the ICSID 
Convention.107 
On the question of the foreign investor’s autonomy to select the 
arbitral forum, Cuba’s treaties with the United Kingdom and Swit-
zerland present a rather unusual challenge in requiring the parties to 
agree to a forum on the basis of consensus.108 Only if no agreement 
is reached,109 within a period of three months following notification 
of the claim, can the foreign investor submit the dispute to an ad hoc 
international arbitral tribunal under the arbitration rules of the 
UNCITRAL.110 
                                                                                                             
 100 See Ad art. 10, Protocol incorporated to Cuba-France BIT. 
 101 See Ad art. 9, Protocol incorporated to Cuba-Netherlands BIT. 
 102 See Ad art. 8(2), Protocol incorporated to Cuba-Hungary BIT. 
 103 See Ad art. VI, Protocol incorporated to Cuba-Turkey BIT. 
 104 See Ad art. VIII(2), Protocol incorporated to Cuba-Guatemala BIT. 
 105 See Ad art. 9, Protocol incorporated to Cuba-Venezuela BIT. 
 106 See Ad art. 8(2)(b), Protocol incorporated to Cuba-Peru BIT. 
 107 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (the 
“ICSID Convention”). Note that Cuba has not signed the ICSID Convention. Re-
fer to Professor Mendoza’s observations in Juan Mendoza Díaz, Cuba y el Arbi-
traje de Inversión, Un Tema Insoslayable, INVERSIÓN EXTRANJERA LA HABANA: 
INSTITUTO CUBANO DEL LIBRO, 168 (2015). Also refer to Juan Mendoza Díaz, 
Arbitraje de Inversión: Una mirada desde Cuba, REVISTA CUBANA DE DERECHO 
39, 15 (2012). Similarly, Cuba is not a signatory of the Inter-American Conven-
tion on International Commercial Arbitration signed in Panama on January 30, 
1975 under the aegis of the Organization of American States (commonly referred 
to as the Panama Convention). 
 108 Cuba-United Kingdom BIT, supra note 64, at art. 8(2); Cuba-Switzerland 
BIT, supra note 69, at art. 10(2). 
 109 Cuba-Barbados BIT, supra note 64, at art. 8(2). While mirroring the lan-
guage of the above-referenced provision of the Cuba-United Kingdom BIT, re-
mains silent on how to infuse life on an arbitral proceeding where the parties can-
not possibly agree on a forum. 
 110 See, Cuba-Switzerland BIT, supra note 69, at art. 10(3). (“Si après une 
période de trois mois à compter de la notification de la prétention aucun accord 
n’est intervenu sur l’une des procedures susmentionnées, le différend sera soumis, 
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D. The Fork in the Road 
Only a handful of Cuban BITs require the foreign investor to 
exhaust local remedies before submitting the claim to international 
arbitration. Article VI(2) of the Cuba-Turkey BIT, for instance, 
grants the foreign investor standing to submit the dispute to the ICC 
or to an ad hoc international arbitral tribunal under the UNCITRAL 
arbitration rules “provided that the investor concerned has brought 
the dispute before the courts of justice of the Party that is a party to 
the dispute and a final award has not been rendered within one 
year.”111 All to the contrary, however, under its treaties with Austria 
and Chile, Cuba explicitly renounces “the requirement that the in-
ternal administrative or judicial remedies should be exhausted.”112 
The uneasy cohabitation of the international and domestic legal 
orders, so present in investment treaty arbitration, comes to light ra-
ther prominently in the fork-in-the-road provisions of Cuba’s BITs. 
Although not universally adopted throughout the vast universe of 
Cuba’s investment treaties, the latter’s agreements with Portugal,113 
                                                                                                             
à la demande écrite de l’investisseur en cause, à l’arbitrage selon les Régles d’ar-
bitrage de la Commission des Nations Unies pour le droit commercial internatio-
nal en vigueur.”). 
 111 Cuba-Turkey BIT, supra note 65, at art. VI(2). 
 112 Cuba-Austria BIT, supra note 57, at art. 12(2); See also Cuba-Chile BIT, 
supra note 58, at art. 8(2)(c). (“[L]as partes renuncian a exigir el agotamiento de 
recursos judiciales internos.”). 
 113 Cuba-Portugal BIT, supra note 63, at art.9(3) (“Uma vez submetido o di-
ferendo a um dos procedimentos referidos no número anterior, a selecção será 
definitiva.”). 
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Bolivia,114 Peru,115 Venezuela,116 Guatemala,117 Chile,118 and Ar-
gentina,119 among others, do contain explicit fork-in-the-road 
clauses. The linguistic structure of the typical Cuban fork-in-the-
road provision, as reproduced in Article 9(2) of the Cuba-Argentina 
BIT, stands as follows: 
Once an investor has submitted the dispute either to 
the jurisdiction of the Contracting Party involved or 
to international arbitration, the choice of one or the 
other of these procedures shall be final.120 
Admittedly, the effectiveness of these fork-in-the-road clauses 
will depend on whether the international arbitral tribunal is per-
suaded that the claims and parties present before the Cuban domestic 
court are identical to those before it.121 Otherwise, the foreign inves-
                                                                                                             
 114 Cuba-Bolivia BIT, supra note 61, at art. IX(3) (“Una vez que el inversio-
nista haya remitido la controversia al tribunal competente de la Parte Contratante 
en cuyo territorio se hubiese efectuado la inversión o al tribunal arbitral, la elec-
ción de uno u otro procedimiento será definitiva.”). 
 115 Cuba-Peru BIT, supra note 77, at art.8(3) (“Una vez que se haya sometido 
la controversia al tribunal competente de la Parte Contratante en cuyo territorio se 
hubiera efectuado la inversión o al arbitraje internacional, bajo alguno de los foros 
indicados, la elección de tal procedimiento será definitiva.”). 
 116 Cuba-Venezuela BIT, supra note 66, at art. 9(2) (“El inversor que haya 
optado por someter la controversia a los tribunales de la Parte Contratante, no 
podrá luego recurrir al arbitraje.”). 
 117 Cuba-Guatemala BIT, supra note 61, at art. VIII(3) (“Una vez que el in-
versionista haya remitido la controversia al tribunal competente de la Parte Con-
tratante en cuyo territorio se hubiera efectuado la inversión o al tribunal arbitral, 
la elección de uno u otro procedimiento será definitiva.”). 
 118 Cuba-Chile BIT, supra note 58, at art. 8(3) (“Una vez que el inversionista 
haya remitido la controversia al tribunal competente de la Parte Contratante en 
cuyo territorio se hubiera efectuado la inversión o al tribunal arbitral, la elección 
de uno u otro procedimiento será definitiva.”). 
 119 Cuba-Argentina BIT, supra note 67, at art. 9(2) (“Una vez que un inversor 
haya sometido la controversia a las jurisdicciones de la Parte Contratante impli-
cada o al arbitraje internacional, la elección de uno u otro de esos procedimientos 
será definitiva.”). 
 120 Id. 
 121 In the words of Professor Jan Paulsson, “[t]he key is to assess whether the 
same dispute has been submitted to both the national and international fora.” Pan-
techniki S.A. Contractors and Engineers v. Republic of Albania, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/21, Award, ¶ 61 (July 30, 2009). For arbitral authority finding no identity 
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tor will be allowed to elevate the dispute against Cuba to the inter-
national plane —even after having appeared before the local 
court.122 
E. Choice of Law 
In similar fashion to the fork-in-the-road problématique, another 
issue that brings to the surface the natural tension between the inter-
national and domestic legal systems is the choice of law question. 
More often than not, the run-of-the-mill foreign investment project 
in Cuba (or elsewhere) will touch upon elements of local corporate, 
tax, property, administrative, monetary, and even constitutional 
law,123 while at the same time implicating issues arising under cus-
tomary international law such as the rules of treaty interpretation.124 
                                                                                                             
of claims and parties, in the context of the fork-in-the-road clauses of the U.S.-
Argentina and Oman-Yemen BITs respectively, see CMS Gas Transmission Com-
pany v. Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/08, Decision on Juris-
diction, ¶ 80 (July 17, 2003) (“[A]s contractual claims are different from treaty 
claims, even if there had been or there currently was a recourse to the local courts 
for breach of contract, this would not have prevented submission of the treaty 
claims to arbitration”) and Desert Line Projects LLC v. Republic of Yemen, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/05/17, Award ¶ 138 (February 6, 2008) (“In sum, the settlement 
of the Claimant’s contractual claims in the Yemeni Arbitration does not bar the 
Arbitral Tribunal from having jurisdiction in the present case, since the claims 
formulated by the Claimant here are capable of constituting violations of the BIT 
if they are upheld.”).. 
 122 As Professors Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer have observed, 
“[o]nly rarely did tribunals find that the fundamental basis of the claim before 
them was the same as before the domestic courts.” Dolzer and Schreuer, Princi-
ples of International Investment Law 2d edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012), 267-268. Note that one of the very few arbitral authorities precluding the 
submission of an international investment claim on the basis of a foreign inves-
tor’s transgression of a fork-in-the-road clause is the above-referenced Pantech-
niki v. Republic of Albania Award. (“Having made the election to seise the na-
tional jurisdiction the Claimant is no longer permitted to raise the same contention 
before ICSID.”) Pantechniki, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/21 at ¶ 67. 
 123 Note that issues as consequential as what constitutes a “protected invest-
ment” and who is a “protected investor” under Cuba’s BITs is left, almost univer-
sally, to the dictates of Cuban domestic law. Wayne Sachs, The New U.S. Bilateral 
Investment Treaties, 2 INT’L TAX & BUS. LAW. 192, 203 (1984). 
 124 Note that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties codifies the rules 
of treaty interpretation found in customary international law. See, for instance, 
Methanex Corporation v. United States of America NAFTA, 14 44 I.L.M. 1345, 
Final Award, ¶ 29. (Aug. 3, 2005). See also CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech 
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The complexities surrounding the interactions between these paral-
lel legal orders clearly encapsulates the relevance of the choice of 
law question all throughout the life of the investment treaty arbitra-
tion --- from the jurisdictional stage all the way to the liability and 
remedies’ phases of the dispute settlement proceeding. 
Cuba’s BITs, however, offer no standard blueprint with respect 
to the choice of law formulation. A fairly significant number of Cu-
ban investment treaties, for instance, fail to include a choice of law 
clause designating the substantive law governing the arbitral proce-
dure. In those cases where Cuba and the other contracting party to 
the bilateral investment treaty have remained silent as to the choice 
of law selection while consenting to the jurisdiction of the ICC or to 
the use of the arbitration rules of the UNCITRAL, the answer to the 
choice of law inquiry is to be found in Articles 21 and 35 of the 
ICC’s and the UNCITRAL rules, respectively; both of which estab-
lish that in the absence of an explicit choice of law designation “the 
arbitral tribunal shall apply the law which it determines to be appro-
priate.”125 
Interestingly, under Article 22 of the widely used rules of the 
Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce 
(“SCC”) and Article 22.3 of the rules of the London Court of Inter-
national Arbitration (“LCIA”) the result would be the same, since 
pursuant to both provisions the arbitral tribunal enjoys ample au-
thority to, in the absence of a designation by the parties, apply “the 
law(s) or rules of law which it considers appropriate.”126 
Along similar lines, a tribunal presiding an investment treaty ar-
bitration involving Cuba under the Additional Facility Rules must, 
in the absence of an explicit choice of law clause, apply “the law 
                                                                                                             
Republic, UNCITRAL, Separate Opinion on the Issue at the Quantum, ¶¶ 15-16 
(Mar. 14, 2003). 
 125 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art. 35 (2010). Article 21 of the ICC Rules 
uses almost identical language: “In the absence of any such agreement, the arbitral 
tribunal shall apply the rules of law which it determines to be appropriate.” For 
in-depth analysis of these two provisions See, e.g., SCHÜTZE, INSTITUTIONAL 
ARBITRATION 109-14, 1209-118 (Munich: C.H. Beck, Rolf ed. 2013). 
 126 LCIA Arbitration Rules art. 22.3 (1998). Article 22 of the SCC Rules 
equally establishes that in the absence of a choice of law clause, the arbitral tribu-
nal shall apply “the law or rules of law, whichever it considers to be most appro-
priate.” See also SCHÜTZE, supra note 118, at 473-74, 835-37. 
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determined by the conflict of laws rules which it considers applica-
ble and such rules of international law as the Tribunal considers ap-
plicable.”127 
In the context of a purely ad hoc investment arbitration, devoid 
of any institutional trappings where the contracting parties have 
failed to select the dispute’s governing law, the choice of law deter-
mination would squarely befall on the arbitral tribunal as a deriva-
tion of its inherent adjudicative authority. 
Cuba’s investment treaties with, for instance, Mexico,128 Aus-
tria,129 Lebanon,130 and Greece131 stand for the opposite approach. 
Each of these treaties contains an explicit choice of law provision 
designating, almost invariably, the relevant BIT together with the 
“applicable rules and principles of international law” as the govern-
ing law of any dispute arising between Cuba and an investor of the 
other contracting party to the agreement. 
                                                                                                             
 127 ICSID Additional Facility Rules, art. 54, (Apr. 10, 2016), available at 
https://eguides.cmslegal.com/pdf/arbitration_volume_II/CMS%20GtA_Vol%20
II_3_11_ICSID%20Additional%20Facility%20Rules.pdf. Note that Article 42(1) 
of the ICSID Convention mirrors this language: “The Tribunal shall decide a dis-
pute in accordance with such rules of law as may be agreed by the parties. In the 
absence of such agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the law of the Contracting 
State party to the dispute (including its rules on the conflict of laws) and such 
rules of international law as may be applicable.”) 
 128 Cuba-Mexico BIT, supra note 62, at app. 4 art. 7(1) (“Cualquier tribunal 
establecido conforme a este Apéndice decidirá las controversias que se sometan 
a su consideración de conformidad con las disposiciones del presente Acuerdo, a 
las reglas aplicables y a los principios del Derecho Internacional.”). 
 129 Cuba-Austria BIT, supra note 57, at art. 15(1) (“A tribunal established un-
der this Part shall decide the dispute in accordance with this Agreement and ap-
plicable rules and principles of international law.”). 
 130 Cuba-Lebanon BIT, supra note 60, at art. 7(3) (“The arbitral tribunal shall 
decide the dispute in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement and the 
applicable rules and principles of international law.”). 
 131 Cuba-Greece BIT, supra note 55, at art. 10(4) (“The arbitral tribunal shall 
decide the dispute in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement and the 
applicable rules and principles of international law.”). 
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Cuba’s BIT’s with Argentina,132 Spain,133 and China,134 moreo-
ver, incorporate an additional feature to their respective choice of 
law provisions, and that is a renvoi clause135 affording the arbitral 
tribunal sufficient flexibility to import legal constructs from other 
legal systems by applying Cuba’s own conflict of laws rules.136 
Although the vast majority of Cuban BITs establish no hierar-
chical or pyramidal order in the application of either domestic or 
international law,137 it is safe to conclude that international law 
                                                                                                             
 132 Cuba-Argentina BIT, supra note 67, at art. 9(4) (“El órgano arbitral deci-
dirá en base a las disposiciones del presente Acuerdo, al derecho de la Parte Con-
tratante que sea parte en la controversia, incluidas las normas relativas a conflictos 
de leyes, a los términos de eventuales acuerdos particulares concluidos con rela-
ción a la inversión, como así también a los principios del derecho internacional 
en la materia.”). 
 133 Cuba-Spain BIT, supra note 64, at art. XI(3) (“The decisions of the arbitral 
tribunal shall be based on: The provisions of this Agreement and those of other 
agreements between the Contracting Parties; The widely accepted norms and prin-
ciples of international law; The domestic legislation of the Contracting Party in 
whose territory the investment was made, including the rules on conflicts of 
law.”). 
 134 Cuba-China BIT art. 9(7) (“The tribunal shall adjudicate in accordance 
with the law of the Contracting Party to the dispute accepting the investment in-
cluding its rules on the conflict of laws, the provisions of this Agreement as well 
as the generally recognized principles of international law accepted by both Con-
tracting Parties.”). Note that this is the language used in the old generation Cuba-
China BIT, signed on April 24, 1995 and renegotiated in 2007. For an analysis of 
China’s old generation BITs see, e.g., , Ko-Yung Tung and Rafael Cox Alomar, 
The New Generation of China BITs in light of Tza Yap Shum v. Republic of Peru, 
17 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 461 (2007). 
 135 Note that Article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention also includes a renvoi 
clause. For relevant commentary see CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID 
CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 601-02 (Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
 136 For an illuminating treatise, in 2 volumes, on Cuban private international 
law refer to Rodolfo Dávalos Fernández, Derecho Internacional Privado: Parte 
General (La Habana: Editorial Félix Varela, 2006) and Rodolfo Dávalos Fernán-
dez, Taydit Peña Lorenzo and María del Carmen Santibáñez Freire, Derecho In-
ternacional Privado: Parte Especial (La Habana: Editorial Félix Varela, 2007). 
While deserving careful and thoughtful analysis in a separate writing, it is worth 
pointing out that the rules of Cuban private international law amount to a complex, 
and rather asymmetrical, web of positive law provisions found for the most part 
in the so-called Bustamante Code (1928) and the Cuban Civil Code. 
 137 On the absence of a choice of law hierarchy , see the observations made by 
the arbitral tribunals in CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic, 
UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶ 400 (Mar. 14, 2003) (“The Tribunal’s analysis is that 
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would govern the overwhelming majority of investment treaty arbi-
trations involving Cuba. 
F. Remedies 
It is well settled that arbitral tribunals do possess inherent au-
thority to award both pecuniary and non-pecuniary remedies,138 in-
cluding restitutionary,139 declaratory,140 injunctive, and interim re-
lief.141 This notwithstanding, a number of Cuban BITs limit the ar-
                                                                                                             
the application of the four sources of law as provided for in art. 8 (6) of the [Neth-
erlands-Czech Republic] Treaty have no ranking according to the wording of the 
Treaty.”); National Grid, P.L.C. v. Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL, Award, ¶ 82 
(November 3, 2008) (“This provision points to the application of the Treaty itself, 
Argentine law including its rules on conflict of laws), and “the applicable princi-
ples of international law.” Although the Parties do not disagree that these are the 
relevant sources of law applicable to this dispute, they note the absence of specific 
guidelines under the Treaty as to which aspect of the dispute is governed by one 
source or the other and how those sources interact in case of conflict inter se.” 
 138 See, e.g., LG&E Energy Corp. et. al v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/02/1, ¶ 32 (Award, July 25, 2007) (“Reparation can thus take the form 
of restitution or compensation.”) Article 34 of the Articles on Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001) establishes that “[f]ull reparation 
for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act shall take the form of 
restitution, compensation and satisfaction either singly or in combination [ . . . ]”), 
available in Yearbook of the International Law Commission Vol. 2 (New York: 
United Nations, 2001), available at http://legal.un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooks
/english/ilc_2001_v2_p2.pdf. 
 139 See Von Pezold v. Republic of Zimbabwe, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/15, 
Award, ¶ 700 (July 28, 2015) (“[I]t is beyond doubt that non-pecuniary remedies, 
including restitution, can be awarded in ICSID Convention arbitrations under in-
vestment treaties.”). The same maxim applies to investment treaty arbitrations in-
volving Cuban BIT’s even without the ICSID radius. 
 140 See Quiborax S.A. and Non Metallic Minerals S.A. v. Plurinational State 
of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/2, Award, ¶ 560 (Sept. 16, 2015) (“The fact 
that some types of satisfaction are not available does not mean that the Tribunal 
cannot make a declaratory judgment as a means of satisfaction under Article 37 
of the ILC Articles, if appropriate. Moreover, this is also a power inherent to the 
Tribunal’s mandate to resolve the dispute.”). 
 141 See Paushok et. al. v. Government of Mongolia, UNCITRAL, Order on 
Interim Measures, ¶ 45 (Sept. 2, 2008) (“It is internationally recognized that five 
standards have to be met before a tribunal will issue an order in support of interim 
measures. They are (1) prima facie jurisdiction, (2) prima facie establishment of 
the case, (3) urgency, (4) imminent danger of serious prejudice (necessity) and (5) 
proportionality.”) Of singular importance in the Cuban context are UNCITRAL’s 
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bitral tribunal’s remedial authority to the rendering of money dam-
ages. Both the old Cuba-China BIT142 and, more importantly, the 
Cuba-Venezuela BIT143 explicitly limit the tribunal’s jurisdiction to 
the assessment of pecuniary remedies. Yet, such limitation is ren-
dered useless, for instance, within the context of an illegal expropri-
ation claim --- where under the so-called Chorzów rule, the standard 
of compensation is to be found not in the lex specialis (i.e. the ap-
plicable Cuban BIT), but rather in customary international law.144 
Similarly, while most Cuban BITs remain silent as to the nature 
of the remedies available under them,145 there is an overwhelming 
consensus in international arbitral authority to the effect that “the 
right to compensation for breaches of international law follows from 
general principles of international law as supplemented by general 
principles of law recognized by civilized nations.”146 Thus, in the 
event an international arbitral tribunal finds Cuba in violation of its 
obligations under an investment treaty, the arbitrators would possess 
ample authority to articulate an award consisting of both pecuniary 
and non-pecuniary remedies, even in the face of a silent BIT. 
Admittedly, complex issues of sovereign immunity and interna-
tional comity will make non-pecuniary remedies utterly impractical 
                                                                                                             
Article 26, ICC’s Article 28, LCIA’s Article 25 and SCC’s Article 32 on interim 
and conservatory measures. 
 142 See Cuba-China BIT, supra note 134, at art. 9(3) (renegotiated in 2007), 
which limited China’s and Cuba’s consent to international arbitration only for the 
purpose of determining “the amount of compensation for expropriation.” 
 143 See Cuba-Venezuela BIT, supra note 66, at art. 9(4) (La jurisdicción del 
tribunal arbitral se limitará a determinar si la Parte Contratante de que se trate ha 
incumplido [ . . . ] y si tal incumplimiento ha ocurrido y ha causado daños al in-
versor, a fijar la suma que deberá pagar la Parte Contratante al inversor como 
indemnización de tales daños.”). 
 144 Rafael Cox Alomar, “Compensation in the Context of Unlawful Expropri-
ations,” in IAN A. LAIRD, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 235 (New York: Juris, 2016). 
 145 It is worth noting, however, that Article 16(1) of the Cuba-Austria BIT 
explicitly establishes that declaratory and restitutionary relief is available under 
the treaty. Similarly, Articles V(3) and VI(1) of the Cuba-Spain BIT also provide 
for restitutionary relief both in the context of a claim for expropriation or for losses 
resulting from war, armed conflict and states of emergency. 
 146 SwemBalt AB, Sweden v. Republic of Latvia, UNCITRAL, Award, ¶ 38 
(Oct. 23, 2000). 
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or unviable under certain circumstances.147 However, there is no 
bright line rule in customary international law precluding an inter-
national arbitral tribunal from awarding non-pecuniary relief to an 
aggrieved foreign investor if the factual and legal realities surround-
ing the claim warrant it.148 The opposite is true of punitive damages 
against a sovereign state, which are unavailable as a matter of cus-
tomary international law.149 
The rendering of the award, once the remedies stage of the arbi-
tral proceeding has concluded, leads the foreign investor to the more 
momentous phase of recognition and enforcement of the tribunal’s 
decision. 
G. Recognition and Enforcement 
Cuba’s BITs refer the party seeking recognition and enforce-
ment to the domestic legal order of the jurisdiction where enforce-
ment is sought. The language used in the recognition and enforce-
ment clauses of Cuba’s BITs is not identical. While most Cuban 
BITs explicitly refer the moving party to the “domestic” or “na-
tional” law of the jurisdiction where recognition and enforcement is 
                                                                                                             
 147 Note, for instance, that Article 54 of the ICSID Convention only mandates 
the enforcement of “the pecuniary obligations imposed by [the] award as if it were 
a final judgment of a court in that State.” Thus, non-pecuniary awards are left out 
of the self-contained enforcement mechanism available under the ICSID Conven-
tion in no small measure due to issues of sovereign immunity and international 
comity. ICSID Convention, available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Docu-
ments/resources/2006%20CRR_English-final.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2017). 
 148 Rafael Cox Alomar, “Compensation in the Context of Unlawful Expropri-
ations,” The Journal of Damages in International Arbitration, available at 
https://arbitrationlaw.com/library/compensation-context-unlawful-expropria-
tions-journal-damages-international-arbitration-vol-3. 
 149 See Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
art. 37(3) and in particular Commentary 8 to the text adopted by the International 
Law Commission, which appears in Yearbook of the International Law Commis-
sion Vol. 2 (New York: United Nations, 2001). See also Cuba-Mexico BIT, supra 
note 62, at art. 8(4) explicitly forbids the rendering of punitive damages. Of inter-
est is the fact that NAFTA also expressly precludes tribunals from awarding pu-
nitive damages. See NAFTA’s Chapter 11, Article 1135(3). 
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sought,150 some merely reiterate that the award “shall be final and 
binding,”151 while other agreements simply remain silent.152 
Despite the dissimilar language, the procedural route for recog-
nition and enforcement under all Cuban investment treaties leads to 
the domestic legal plane. The recognition and enforcement of for-
eign arbitral awards in Cuba is governed by Articles 483, 484, and 
485 of the Law of Civil, Administrative, and Labor Procedure (Ley 
de Procedimiento Civil, Administrativo, y Laboral),153 as well as by 
the strictures of the New York Convention—which has been in full 
force and effect on Cuban soil since March 30, 1975.154 
Article 483 of the Cuban statute provides for the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards meeting the following crite-
ria: firstly, the underlying legal action must have been presented in 
personam; secondly, the arbitral award must have been rendered in 
the ordinary course not in default (rebeldía); thirdly, the obligations 
requiring performance under the award must be legal in nature per 
the applicable Cuban legislation; fourthly, the award, together with 
all other accompanying documents, must be authenticated according 
to the laws of the jurisdiction where it was made; fifthly, in the event 
                                                                                                             
 150 See, inter alia, Cuba-Turkey BIT, supra note 65, at art. VI(3); Cuba-Chile 
BIT, supra note 58, at art. 8(5); Cuba-Netherlands BIT, supra note 54, at art. 9(3); 
Cuba-Guatemala BIT, supra note 61, at art. VIII(4); Cuba-Bolivia BIT, supra note 
61, at art. IX(5); Cuba-Portugal BIT, supra note 63, at art. 9(4); Cuba-Peru BIT, 
supra note 77, at art. 8(4); Cuba-Germany BIT, supra note 77, at art. 11(2); Cuba-
Lebanon BIT, supra note 60, at art. 7(3); Cuba-Greece BIT, supra note 55, at art. 
10(4); Cuba-Argentina BIT, supra note 67, art. 9(5); Cuba-Spain BIT, supra note 
64, at art. XI(4). 
 151 See, inter alia, Cuba-Hungary BIT, supra note 59, at art. 8(2)(b); Cuba-
Slovakia BIT, supra note 59, at art. 8(2); Cuba-Venezuela BIT, supra note 66, at 
art. 9(5); Cuba-Indonesia BIT, supra note 64, at art. VIII(3). 
 152 See, inter alia, Cuba-France BIT, supra note 68, at art. 10; Cuba-Italy BIT, 
supra note 70, at art. 9; Cuba-Switzerland BIT, supra note 69, at art. 10; Cuba-
Romania BIT, supra note 56, at art. 9; Cuba-United Kingdom BIT, supra note 64, 
at art. 8; Cuba-Barbados BIT, supra note 64, at art. 8. 
 153 Refer to Dávalos Fernández, Taydit Peña Lorenzo and María del Carmen 
Santibáñez Freire, Derecho Internacional Privado: Parte Especial, LA HABANA, 
260 (2007) (Cuba). Note, moreover, that the Ley de Procedimiento Civil, Admin-
istrativo y Laboral was enacted by the National Assembly of People’s Power dur-
ing the ordinary session taking place on July 12-14, 1977. 
 154 United Nations Convention for the Recognition and Enforcement of For-
eign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (the “New 
York Convention”). 
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the award was issued in a non-contracting state to the New York 
Convention, it must also come with a declaration from the ministry 
of foreign affairs of the country of origin, certifying that an award 
rendered in Cuba would also be afforded recognition and enforce-
ment therein on a reciprocal basis;155 and sixthly, the moving party 
must identify with particularity the Cuban domicile of the person 
(natural or juridical) against whom recognition and enforcement is 
sought.156 
Article 484, moreover, designates the Cuban Supreme Court as 
the forum where the petition for recognition and enforcement must 
be presented, unless an international treaty ratified by Cuba provides 
otherwise.157 The petition, moreover, along with its Spanish transla-
tion, shall be served on the person (natural or juridical) against 
whom recognition and enforcement is sought.158 The Cuban Su-
preme Court shall hear the respondent within 10 days from the ser-
vice of notice, at which point the Court will either grant or deny the 
petition without the possibility of further review.159 
The Cuban statute, however, must be read in tandem with the 
New York Convention. It is well settled that non-ICSID investment 
arbitration awards against Cuba or its instrumentalities fall under the 
scope of the New York Convention,160 and, hence, are susceptible 
                                                                                                             
 155 Note that in acceding to the New York Convention, Cuba made the reser-
vation that with respect to non-contracting parties it would only enforce the Con-
vention on the basis of reciprocity. New York Arbitration Convention, available 
at http://www.newyorkconvention.org/countries (last visited Feb. 17, 2017). 
 156 See LEY DE PROCEDIMIENTO CIVIL, ADMINISTRATIVO Y 
LABORAL art. 483 (Cuba). 
 157 See Id., at art. 484 (Cuba). 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id., at art. 485 (Cuba). 
 160 Cuba-Switzerland BIT, supra note 69, at art. 13 provides, in part, that 
“[c]laims submitted to arbitration under this Part shall be considered to arise out 
of a commercial relationship or transaction for purposes of Article 1 of the New 
York Convention.” Cuba-Mexico BIT, supra note 62, at art. 9(5) mirrors this lan-
guage, “Para los efectos del Artículo 1 de la Convención de Nueva York, se con-
siderará que la reclamación que se somete a arbitraje conforme a este Apéndice, 
surge de una relación u operación comercial.” For a robust analysis showing that 
sovereign states and public entities fall under the New York Convention’s rubric 
of “persons,” see REINMAR WOLFF, NEW YORK CONVENTION, 69-70 (Munich: 
C.H. Beck, 2012). 
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to challenge on the basis of the various escape hatches provided un-
der Article V of the Convention.161 
H. The MFN Clause 
A most relevant feature of a growing number of Cuban BITs is 
the expansive reach of their most-favored-nation (“MFN”) provi-
sions. Under Cuba’s bilateral investment treaties with, for instance, 
the United Kingdom,162 Germany,163 Slovakia,164 Barbados,165 
Peru,166 Bolivia,167 and Turkey,168 the language of the MFN clause 
explicitly suggests that MFN treatment extends to dispute settle-
ment; which means that “if a third-party treaty contains provisions 
for the settlement of disputes that are more favorable to the protec-
tion of the investor’s rights and interests than those in the basic 
treaty, such provisions may be extended to the beneficiary of the 
most favored nation clause as they are fully compatible with the 
ejusdem generis principle.”169 
This notwithstanding, most Cuban MFN provisions remain si-
lent as to their applicability to dispute settlement. Thus, it would 
                                                                                                             
 161 Besides challenges on the basis of sovereign immunity, lack of arbitrabil-
ity, procedural due process and public policy, non-moving parties have often chal-
lenged recognition and enforcement when the arbitral award has been set aside by 
a court in the jurisdiction where the award was made. See, e.g., Corporación Mex-
icana de Mantenimiento Integral, S. De R.L. de C.V. v. Pemex, 832 F.3d 92 (2d 
Cir. 2016), where the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the 
U.S. District Court for the District of New York’s recognition and enforcement of 
an arbitral award rendered in Mexico against Pemex despite the fact that a Mexi-
can court had vacated it. See generally, Radu Lelutiu, Managing Requests for En-
forcement of Vacated Awards under the New York Convention, 14 AM. REV. INT’L 
ARB. 345 (2003). 
 162 Cuba-United Kingdom BIT, supra note 64, at art. 3(3). 
 163 Cuba-Germany BIT, supra note 77, at art. 3(5). 
 164 Cuba-Slovakia BIT, supra note 59, at art. 3(3). 
 165 Cuba-Barbados BIT, supra note 64, at art. 3(3). 
 166 Cuba-Peru BIT, supra note 77, at art. 3(6). 
 167 Cuba-Bolivia BIT, supra note 61, at art. III(2). 
 168 Cuba-Turkey BIT, supra note 65, at art. II(3). 
 169 Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, 
Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 56 (Jan. 25, 2000), 5 
ICSID Rep. 396 (2002). 
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typically befall on the arbitral tribunal to decide whether to read into 
the MFN clause the inclusion of dispute settlement.170 
IV. STANDARDS OF PROTECTION UNDER CUBA’S BITS 
A. Protected Foreign Investment 
Substantively, Cuba’s BITs offer the foreign investor the typical 
assortment of legal protections and safeguards available in most in-
ternational investment treaties. More specifically, Cuban BITs al-
most universally provide overly broad definitions of what consti-
tutes a “protected investment” under the applicable investment 
agreement. Article 1(a) of the Cuba-Barbados BIT, for instance, es-
tablishes that: 
For purposes of this Agreement: 
(a) ‘investment’ means every kind of asset and in par-
ticular, though not exclusively, includes: 
(i) movable and immovable property and any 
other property rights such as mortgages, liens or 
pledges; 
                                                                                                             
 170 Note that far from homogenous, arbitral tribunals have shown themselves 
in disagreement as to whether a silent MFN provision should be read as expan-
sively as to allow the bypassing of the basic treaty’s dispute settlement mecha-
nism. See ,Sanum Inv. Ltd. v. Gov’t of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 
PSA Case No. 2013-13, Award on Jurisdiction, ¶ 358 (Dec. 13, 2013), (Perm. Ct. 
Arb. 2013). (“[T]o read into that clause a dispute settlement provision to cover all 
protections under the Treaty when the Treaty itself provides for very limited ac-
cess to international arbitration would result in a substantial re-write of the Treaty 
and an extension of the State Parties’ consent to arbitration beyond what may be 
assumed to have been their intention.”) Wintershall Aktiengesellschaft v. Argen-
tine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/14, Award, ¶ 167 (Dec. 8, 2008), availa-
ble at http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C39/D
C1492_En.pdf. (“Ordinarily, an MFN Clause would not operate so as to replace 
one means of dispute settlement with another . . . the prospect of an investor se-
lecting at will from an assorted variety of options provided in other treaties nego-
tiated with other parties under different circumstances, dislodges the dispute res-
olution provision in the basic treaty itself.”). 
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(ii) shares in and stock and debentures of a com-
pany and any other form of participation in a 
company; 
(iii) claims to money or to any performance un-
der contract having a financial value; 
(iv) intellectual property rights, goodwill, tech-
nical processes and know-how; 
(v) business concessions conferred by law or un-
der contract, including concessions to search for, 
cultivate, extract or exploit natural resources.171 
The language of the Cuba-Barbados BIT, premised on an expan-
sive asset-based concept of what amounts to a “protected invest-
ment” under the treaty, is also present in Cuba’s BITs with, for in-
stance, the United Kingdom,172 Slovakia,173 Germany,174 Peru,175 
Bolivia,176 Turkey,177 Austria,178 Mexico,179 Indonesia,180 Vi-
etnam,181 Romania,182 France,183 Hungary,184 Greece,185 Leba-
non,186 the Netherlands,187 Spain,188 and China.189 In construing the 
                                                                                                             
 171 Cuba-Barbados BIT, supra note 64, at art. 1(a). 
 172 Cuba-United Kingdom BIT, supra note 64, at art. 1(a) (“every kind of as-
set”). 
 173 Cuba-Slovakia BIT, supra note 59, at art. 1(1) (“every kind of asset”). 
 174 Cuba-Germany BIT, supra note 77, at art.1(1) (“toda clase de bienes”). 
 175 Cuba-Peru BIT, supra note 77, at art. 1(1) (“toda clase de activos”). 
 176 Cuba-Bolivia BIT, supra note 61, at art. I(1) (“toda clase de bienes o dere-
chos relacionados”). 
 177 Cuba-Turkey BIT, supra note 65, at art. 1(2) (“every kind of asset.”). 
 178 Cuba-Austria BIT, supra note 57, at art. 1(2) (“every kind of asset”). 
 179 Cuba-Mexico BIT, supra note 62, at art. 1 (“cualquier tipo de activo”). 
 180 Cuba-Indonesia BIT, supra note 64, at art. 1(1) (“any kind of asset”). 
 181 Cuba-Vietnam BIT, supra note 64, at art. 1(1) (“any kind of assets”). 
 182 Cuba-Romania BIT, supra note 56, at art. 1(2) (“every kind of assets”). 
 183 Cuba-France BIT, supra note 68, at art. 1(1) (“tous les avoirs”). 
 184 Cuba-Hungary BIT, supra note 59, at art. 1(1) (“every kind of asset”). 
 185 Cuba-Greece BIT, supra note 55, at art. 1(1) (“every kind of asset”). 
 186 Cuba-Lebanon BIT, supra note 60, at art. 1(2) (“every kind of assets”). 
 187 Cuba-Netherlands BIT, supra note 54, at art. 1(a) (“every kind of asset”). 
 188 Cuba-Spain BIT, supra note 64, at art. I(2) (“any kind of assets”). 
 189 Cuba-China BIT, supra note 134, at art. 1(1) (“every kind of asset”). 
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definition of “protected investment” under a Cuban BIT, an interna-
tional arbitral tribunal ought to look, not at the strictures of Cuban 
domestic law, but rather at international law.190 
It is well settled, moreover, that an investment fraught by ille-
gality does not qualify for protection under any Cuban BIT.191 Un-
surprisingly, a significant number of Cuban BITs explicitly limit the 
treaty’s protection only to those foreign investments made “in con-
formity with” the laws of Cuba and those of the other contracting 
state to the investment treaty.192 
                                                                                                             
 190 Refer, for instance, to République D’Italie v. République de Cuba, Arbi-
trage Ad’Hoc, Sentence Preliminaire, ¶¶ 80-81 (Mar. 15, 2005) (“Les dispositions 
de cette loi ne peuvent être utilisées pour définir la notion d’investissement au 
sens de l’Accord. [ . . . ] [l]a notion d’investissement ne doit pas pouvoir varier et 
fluctuer en fonction des législations nationales de chacun d’entre eux et de leurs 
évolutions respectives. [ . . . ] Il appartient donc au Tribunal Arbitral de rechercher 
dans la jurisprudence internationale et dans la doctrine une définition de la notion 
d’investissement compatible avec les dispositions de l’Accord, son objet et ses 
objectifs.”). See also, Saipem S.P.A. v. People’s Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/05/07, Decision on Jurisdiction and Recommendation on Provi-
sional Measures, ¶ 82 (Mar. 21, 2007) (“[T]he Tribunal cannot depart from the 
general rule that treaties are to be interpreted by reference to international law. It 
is thus not prepared to consider that the term “investment” in Article 1(1) of the 
BIT is defined according to the law of the host State.”). See id. at ¶ 120 (“Accord-
ingly, the question is whether Saipem made an investment within the meaning of 
Article 1(1) of the [Bangladesh-Italy] BIT, without reference to the law of Bang-
ladesh.”). 
 191 The ancient legal principle of ex delicto non oritur actio (“an unlawful act 
cannot serve as the basis of an action in law”) has been widely incorporated to 
international investment law. Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdic-
tion, ¶ 56 (Jan. 25, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 396 (2002). See Fraport AG Frankfurt 
Airport Services Worldwide v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/11/12, Award, ¶ 332 (Dec. 10, 2014) (“As other tribunals have recognized, 
there is an increasingly well-established international principle which makes in-
ternational legal remedies unavailable with respect to illegal investments, at least 
when such illegality goes to the essence of the investment.”). See also Oxus Gold 
v. Republic of Uzbekistan, UNCITRAL, Award, ¶ 706 (Dec. 17, 2015), available 
at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7238_2.pdf 
(“The Arbitral Tribunal agrees . . . that an investment may not qualify for protec-
tion under a BIT, where such investment was made in breach of relevant laws and 
regulations, including international treaties but also national law of the host 
State.”). 
 192 See Cuba-Venezuela. BIT, supra note 66, at art. (2)(e) (“y otros derechos 
otorgados conforme al Derecho Público”); Cuba-Greece BIT, supra note 55, at 
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B. Protected Foreign Investor 
Under Cuban BITs, a “protected foreign investor” is defined as 
a natural or legal person having the nationality of one of the con-
tracting states entering into the BIT.193  Standing, thus, is condi-
tioned to whether the natural or legal persons raising the claim meet 
the nationality requirements of the specific BIT under which protec-
tion is sought. 
In order to enjoy standing to sue Cuba under most Cuban BITs, 
the foreign investor, if a natural person, must be a national of the 
other contracting state to the BIT--- as defined by the latter’s nation-
ality laws.194 If a legal person, it must have been constituted in  
                                                                                                             
art. 1(1)(f) (“in conformity with its laws and regulations”); Cuba-Lebanon BIT, 
supra note 60, at art. 1(2)(d) (“in accordance with the law”); Cuba-Austria BIT, 
supra note 57, at art. 2(1) (“according to its laws and regulations”); Cuba-Roma-
nia BIT, supra note 56, at art.1(2) (“in accordance with the laws and regulations 
of the latter”); Cuba-Turkey BIT, supra note 65, at art. 1(2) I(2) (“in conformity 
with the hosting Party’s laws and regulations”); Cuba-Slovakia BIT, supra note 
59, at art. 1(1) (“in accordance with the laws and regulations of the latter”); Cuba-
Argentina BIT, supra note 67, at art. 1(1) (“de conformidad con las leyes y re-
glamentaciones de la Parte Contratante”); Cuba-Italy BIT, supra note 70, at art. 
1(1) (“in conformità delle leggi e dei regolamenti di quest’ultima”); Cuba-Guate-
mala BIT, supra note 61, at art. I(2) (“de conformidad con las leyes y reglamentos 
de la Parte Contratante”); Cuba-Indonesia BIT, supra note 64, at art. I(1) (“in 
conformity with the laws and regulations of the latter”); Cuba-China BIT, supra 
note 134, at art. 1(1) (“in accordance with the laws and regulations”); Cuba-Chile 
BIT, supra note 58, at art. 1(2) (“de conformidad con las leyes y reglamentos de 
la Parte Contratante”); Cuba-Vietnam BIT, supra note 64, at art. 1(1) (“pursuant 
to the laws and regulations in force”); Cuba-Hungary BIT, supra note 59, at art. 
1(1) (“in accordance with the laws and regulations”); Cuba-Bolivia BIT, supra 
note 61, at art. I(1) (“efectuado de conformidad con las leyes y reglamentos”); 
Cuba-Portugal BIT supra note 63, at art. I(1) (“nos termos da respectiva legislação 
aplicável sobre a matéria”); Cuba-Spain BIT, supra note 64, at art. I(2) (“acquired 
in accordance with the legislation of the country in which the investment is 
made.”). 
 193 Clearly, a Cuban national or legal person has no standing to sue Cuba under 
any bilateral investment treaty. Note that “[i]nvestment treaties confer rights to 
foreign investors, which are unavailable to nationals of the host country. Legiti-
mate policy reasons justify this differential treatment.” See Gallo v.Government 
of Canada, PCA Case No. 55798, Award, ¶ 331 (Sept. 15, 2011) available at 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0351_0.pdf. 
 194 Note that with respect to Cuban investors doing business in the territory of 
the other contracting party to the BIT (besides Cuba) some Cuban BITs require 
both Cuban nationality and permanent domicile in Cuba for protection under the 
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accordance with the laws of the other contracting state to the BIT.195 
Under most Cuban BITs, however, a foreign legal person’s standing 
to bring a claim against Cuba will depend on its compliance with 
additional treaty specific requirements. 
Besides incorporation in accordance with the laws of the other 
contracting state to the bilateral investment treaty, foreign legal per-
sons seeking protection under Cuba’s BITs with, for instance, Tur-
key,196 Spain,197 Portugal,198 and Lebanon,199 must also have their 
“headquarters,” “main office,” “sede,” or “seat” in either Turkish, 
Spanish, Portuguese, or Lebanese territory. Comparatively, under 
Cuba’s BITs with Bolivia,200 Mexico,201 Chile,202 Romania,203 and 
Guatemala,204 the standing of a foreign legal person raising a claim 
against Cuba depends not just on the place of incorporation and the 
geographic location of its corporate seat, but also on whether that 
corporate entity conducts significant business in Bolivian, Mexican, 
Chilean, Romanian, or Guatemalan territory. 
                                                                                                             
bilateral investment treaty. See e.g., Cuba-Austria BIT, supra note 57, at art. 1(1); 
Cuba-Mexico BIT, supra note 62, at art. 1; Cuba-Guatemala BIT, supra note 61, 
at art. 1(1); Cuba-Netherlands BIT, supra note 54, at art. 1(b).. 
 195 See e.g., Cuba-Greece BIT, supra note 55, at art. 1(3); Cuba-Barbados BIT, 
supra note 64, at art 1(d); Cuba-United Kingdom BIT, supra note 64, at art. 1(d); 
Cuba-Indonesia BIT, supra note 64, at art. I(2); Cuba-Austria BIT, supra note 57 
at art.1(1). 
 196 Cuba-Turkey BIT, supra note 65, at art. I(1)(b) (“[ . . . ] and having their 
headquarters in the territory of that Party”). 
 197 Cuba-Spain BIT, supra note 64, at art. I(1)(b) (“[ . . . ] and having their 
main office in the territory of that Contracting Party”). 
 198 Cuba-Portugal BIT supra note 63, at art. 1(3) (“que tenham sede no terri-
tório de uma das Partes Contratantes.”). 
 199 Cuba-Lebanon BIT, supra note 60, at art. 1(1)(b) (“have their seat in the 
territory of that same Contracting Party.”). 
 200 Cuba-Bolivia BIT, supra note 61, at art.I(2)(b) (“asimismo como sus acti-
vidades económicas sustanciales en el territorio de dicha Parte contratante.”). 
 201 Cuba-Mexico BIT, supra note 62, at art.1) (“que desempeñe actividades 
económicas o comerciales en el mismo.”) 
 202 Cuba-Chile BIT, supra note 58, at art. 1(1) (b) (“así como sus actividades 
económicas efectivas.”). 
 203 Cuba-Romania BIT, supra note 56, at art. 1(1)(b) (“together with real eco-
nomic activities in the territory of that same Contracting Party.”). 
 204 Cuba-Guatemala BIT, supra note 61, at art. (1)(b) (“así como sus activida-
des económicas efectivas, en el territorio de dicha Parte Contratante.”). 
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Interestingly, under Cuba’s BITs with France,205 Switzerland,206 
the Netherlands,207 and Venezuela,208 the place of incorporation, the 
location of the corporate seat, or even the significance of the legal 
person’s entrepreneurial presence in French, Swiss, Dutch, or Ven-
ezuelan territory is not dispositive of the standing question. Rather, 
direct or indirect control at the hands of a French, Swiss, Dutch, or 
Venezuelan natural or legal person is sufficient to render standing 
to a company doing business in Cuba with no substantive legal con-
nection to France, Switzerland, the Netherlands, or Venezuela. 
C. Fair and Equitable Treatment 
The Cuban Republic, moreover, extends to all foreign invest-
ments made in the island, under the aegis of a Cuban BIT, fair and 
equitable treatment protection. Article IV(1) of the Cuba-Spain BIT, 
for example, provides that “[e]ach Contracting Party shall guarantee 
fair and equitable treatment in its territory for investments made by 
investors of the other Contracting Party.”209 Despite the obvious ab-
sence of consensus among international arbitral tribunals on the ex-
act content of the fair and equitable treatment protection,210 it is uni-
versally agreed that “conduct that is arbitrary, grossly unfair, unjust 
                                                                                                             
 205 Cuba-France BIT, supra note 68, at art. 1(3) (“ou contrôlée directement ou 
indirectement par des nationaux de l’une des Parties contractantes, ou par des per-
sonnes morales possédant leur siège social sur le territoire de l’une des Parties 
contractantes et constituées conformément à la législation de celle-ci.”). 
 206 Cuba-Switzerland BIT, supra note 69, art. 1(1)(c) (“lorsque plus de 50 pour 
cent de son capital social appartient en pleine proprieté à des personnes de cette 
Partie Contractante; ou lorsque des personnes de cette Partie Contractante ont la 
capacité de nommer une majorité de ses administrateurs, ou sont autrement habi-
litées en droit à diriger ses opérations.”). 
 207 Cuba-Netherlands BIT, supra note 54, at art. 1(b) (“[ . . . ] legal persons 
not constituted under the law of that Contracting Party but controlled, directly or 
indirectly, by natural persons as defined in (i) or by legal persons as defined in (ii) 
above.”). 
 208 Cuba-Venezuela BIT, supra note 66, at art. 1(1)(b) (“o efectivamente con-
trolada por inversores de esa Parte Contratante.”). 
 209 See Cuba-Spain BIT, supra note 64, at art. IV(1). 
 210 See e.g., Enron Corporation Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award, May 22, 2007, ¶ 256 (May 22, 2007), avail-
able at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0293.pdf 
(“The Tribunal notes that the Respondent is right in arguing that fair and equitable 
treatment is a standard none too clear and precise. This is because international 
law is not too clear and precise either on the treatment due to foreign citizens, 
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or idiosyncratic or that ‘involves a lack of due process leading to an 
outcome which offends judicial propriety’”211 runs counter to the 
fair and equitable protection arising under Cuba’s BITs. 
D. Full Protection and Security 
In a significant number of Cuban BITs, the fair and equitable 
treatment protection is accompanied by yet another substantive safe-
guard, namely the so-called full protection and security standard.212 
Article 3(1) of the Cuba-Austria BIT, for instance, establishes that 
“[e]ach Contracting Party shall accord to investments by investors 
of the other Contracting Party  . . .  full and constant protection and 
security.”213 Contrary to the fair and equitable treatment safeguard, 
the full protection and security standard is far more specific, and less 
abstract, than the former one.214 Under the full protection and secu-
rity standard, Cuba is, thus, bound by treaty to adopt all necessary 
                                                                                                             
traders and investors or with respect to the fact that the pertinent standards have 
gradually evolved over the centuries. Customary international law, treaties of 
friendship, commerce and navigation, and more recently bilateral investment trea-
ties, have all contributed to this development.”). 
 211 Total S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/1, Decision on 
Liability, December 27, 2010, ¶ 110 (Dec. 27, 2010), http://www.italaw.com
/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0868.pdf. 
 212 In the following Cuban BIT’s, the fair and equitable treatment clause and 
the full protection and security provision appear side by side, in the same section 
of the treaty (this list is non-exhaustive): Cuba-Austria BIT, supra note 57, at 
art.3(1); Cuba-Slovakia. BIT, supra note 59, at art. 2(2); Cuba-Hungary BIT, su-
pra note 59, at art. 2(2); Cuba-Lebanon BIT, supra note 60, at art. 3(1); Cuba-
Barbados BIT, supra note 64, at art 2(2); Cuba-United Kingdom BIT, supra note 
64, at art. 2(2); Cuba-Indonesia BIT, supra note 64, at art. II(2); Cuba-Greece 
BIT, supra note 55, at art. 2(2); Cuba-Mexico BIT, supra note 62, at art. 4(1); 
Cuba-Switzerland.BIT, supra note 69, at art. 4(1); Cuba-Netherlands BIT, supra 
note 54, at art. 3(1); Cuba-Venezuela BIT, supra note 66, at art. 4(1); Cuba-Ar-
gentina BIT, supra note 67, at art. 3(1); Cuba-China BIT, supra note 134, at art. 
3(1). In Cuba’s BIT’s with France and the Netherlands, the full protection and 
security clauses appear under the section on expropriation. See Cuba-France BIT, 
supra note 68, at art. 5(1) (“Les investissements effectués . . . bénéficient . . . 
d’une protection et d’une sécurité pleines et entières.”), and Cuba-Italy BIT, supra 
note 70, at art. 5(1) (“Gli investimenti di capitali degli investitore di una delle 
Parti Contraenti godranno di piena protezione e sicurezza nel territorio 
dell’altra.”). 
 213 See Cuba-Austria BIT, supra note 57, at art.3(1). 
 214 Note that there appears to be a dissonance among international arbitral tri-
bunals on whether the full protection and security standard, besides the physical 
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measures to defend the physical integrity of the foreign investment 
from aggression.215 
E. Force Majeure 
Along similar lines, Cuba’s BITs almost invariably include a 
force majeure clause. The typical force majeure provision reads as 
follows: 
Investors of one Contracting Party, whose invest-
ments in the territory of the other Contracting Party 
suffer losses owing to war or other armed conflict, a 
state of national emergency, revolt, insurrection or 
riot in the territory of the latter Contracting Party, 
shall be accorded by the latter Contracting Party 
treatment, as regards restitution, indemnification, 
compensation or other settlement. The treatment 
shall not be less favourable than that which the latter 
Contracting Party accords to its own investors or in-
vestors of any third state, whichever is more favour-
able to the investors concerned. Payments shall be 
made without delay and in the freely convertible cur-
rencies agreed upon by the parties.216 
                                                                                                             
integrity, also extends to the stability of the legal superstructure applicable to the 
foreign investment. See BG Group Plc. v. Republic of Argentina, Final Award, 
Dec. 24, 2007, ¶ 326 (Dec. 24, 2007), available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/
default/files/case-documents/ita0081.pdf (“The Tribunal is mindful that other tri-
bunals have found that the standard of ‘protection and constant security’ encom-
passes stability of the legal framework applicable to the investment. [ . . . ] How-
ever . . . the Tribunal finds it inappropriate to depart from the originally under-
stood standard of ‘protection and constant security.’”). 
 215 Saluka Investments BV v. The Czech Republic, Partial Award, ¶ 484 (Mar. 
17, 2006), available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents
/ita0740.pdf (“[ . . . ] is not meant to cover just any kind of impairment of an in-
vestor’s investment, but to protect more specifically the physical integrity of an 
investment against interference by use of force.”). 
 216 Cuba-Indonesia BIT, supra note 64, at art. V. 
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Almost identical force majeure language is found in Cuba’s 
BITs with, for instance, the Netherlands,217 Argentina, 218 Leba-
non,219 Spain,220 France,221 Portugal,222 Germany,223 Italy,224 
Peru,225 Bolivia,226 Chile,227 Vietnam,228 Guatemala,229 and Tur-
key.230 A significant number of Cuban BITs provide investors an 
additional layer of protection under their respective force majeure 
clauses. More specifically, under its bilateral investment treaties 
with the United Kingdom,231 Switzerland,232 Austria,233 Greece,234 
Barbados,235 Hungary,236 and Slovakia,237 the Cuban Republic has 
explicitly agreed to offer foreign investors from these jurisdictions 
outright restitution or monetary compensation where the requisition 
or destruction of their respective investments was perpetrated by 
governmental forces, not in combat action and not required to so act 
by the necessity of the situation.238 While not strictly liable for losses 
under either the force majeure or protection and security standards, 
                                                                                                             
 217 Cuba-Netherlands BIT, supra note 54, at art. 7. 
 218 Cuba-Argentina BIT, supra note 67, at art.4(2). 
 219 Cuba-Lebanon BIT, supra note 60, at art.4(4). 
 220 Cuba-Spain BIT, supra note 64, at art. VI(1). 
 221 Cuba-France BIT, supra note 68, at art. 5(3). 
 222 Cuba-Portugal BIT, supra note 63, at art. 5. 
 223 Cuba-Germany BIT, supra note 77, at art. 4(3). 
 224 Cuba-Italy BIT, supra note 70, at art. 4. 
 225 Cuba-Peru BIT, supra note 77, at art. 6. 
 226 Cuba-Bolivia BIT, supra note 61, at art. IV(4). 
 227 Cuba-Chile BIT, supra note 58, at art. 6(4). 
 228 Cuba-Vietnam BIT, supra note 64, at art. 4. 
 229 Cuba-Guatemala BIT, supra note 61, at art. VI(4). 
 230 Cuba-Turkey BIT, supra note 65, at art. III(3). 
 231 Cuba-United Kingdom BIT, supra note 64, at art. 4(2). 
 232 Cuba-Switzerland BIT, supra note 69, at art. 7(2). 
 233 Cuba-Austria BIT, supra note 57, at art. 6(2). 
 234 Cuba-Greece BIT, supra note 55, at art. 6(2). 
 235 Cuba-Barbados BIT, supra note 64, at art. 4(2). 
 236 Cuba-Hungary BIT, supra note 59, at art. 4(2). 
 237 Cuba-Slovakia BIT, supra note 59, at art. 4(2). 
 238 Refer to the arbitral tribunal’s construction of Article 4(2) of the Sri Lanka-
UK BIT, which is both stylistically and substantively analogous to the above-ref-
erenced provisions, available in Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. v. Republic of 
Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Final Award, ¶¶ 57-64 (June 27, 1990), 
6 ICSID Rev.—FILJ 526 (1991). 
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Cuba bears, nonetheless, the legal duty of due diligence.239 Due dil-
igence, in this context, means that Cuba must “adopt all reasonable 
measures to protect assets and property from threats or attacks”240 
to the extent “feasible and practicable under the circumstances.”241 
F. Expropriation 
Cuba’s BITs, furthermore, establish with uncharacteristic clarity 
the framework for determining the legality or illegality of an expro-
priation. Article 5 of the Cuba-Greece BIT is emblematic of the tra-
ditional expropriation clause available in most Cuban treaties, 
Investments by investors of either Contracting Party 
in the territory of the other Contracting Party shall 
not be expropriated, nationalized or subjected to any 
other measure the effects of which would be tanta-
mount to expropriation or naturalization, except in 
the public interest, under due process of law, on a 
non discriminatory basis and against payment of 
prompt, adequate and effective compensation. Such 
compensation shall amount to the market value of the 
investment affected immediately before the actual 
measure was taken or became public knowledge, 
whichever is the earlier, [and] it shall include interest 
from the date of expropriation until the date of pay-
ment  . . .  and shall be freely transferable in a  . . .  
convertible currency.242 
Hence, absent a public purpose, due process of law, and payment 
of prompt, adequate and effective compensation (defined as fair 
market value as of the date of the taking) any expropriation or na-
tionalization of a protected foreign investment at the hands of the 
Cuban Republic would stand in violation of Cuba’s own BITs, thus, 
making such action illegal under international law. In such case the 
                                                                                                             
 239 Saluka Investment BV v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 
¶ 484 (Mar. 17, 2006), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documen
ts/ita0740.pdf (“The host State is, however, obliged to exercise due diligence.”). 
 240 Id. 
 241 Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 183 (2d ed. 2012). 
 242 Cuba-Greece BIT, supra note 55, at art. 5. 
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standard of compensation is found, not in the applicable Cuban BIT, 
but rather in customary international law under the rubric of the 
widely reputed Chorzów Factory rule.243 Of considerable signifi-
cance is the fact that most Cuban BITs make no distinction between 
direct and indirect expropriations.244 Both modalities of confiscation 
stand on equal footing, subject to the same legal framework.245 
                                                                                                             
 243 Under the eponymous Chorzów Factory rule “reparation must, as far as 
possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situ-
ation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been com-
mitted.” In so doing, international arbitral tribunals have been inclined to dis-
aggregate the date of expropriation from the date of valuation for purposes of as-
sessing compensation within the context of an illegal expropriation --- among 
many other measures aimed at making the aggrieved party whole. See Factory at 
Chorzów (Merits), PCIJ Rep. Ser. A (No. 17), 46-47 (1928). See also Yukos Uni-
versal Limited (Isle of Man) v. The Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA Case 
No. AA227, Award on the Merits, ¶ 1765 (July 18, 2014), available at http://
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3279.pdf (“[C]onflat-
ing the measure of damages for a lawful taking with the measure of damages for 
an unlawful taking is, on its face, an unconvincing option.”). 
 244 Reference to indirect expropriation in Cuban BITs usually takes the form 
of language along the following lines: “investments of nationals or companies of 
either Contracting Party shall not be nationalised, expropriated or subjected to 
measures having effect equivalent . . . “ See, e.g., Cuba-United Kingdom BIT, su-
pra note 64, at art. 5(1); For treaties containing similar language see, Cuba-Greece 
BIT, supra note 48, at art. 5(1); Cuba-Indonesia BIT, supra note 64, at art. IV; 
Cuba-Slovakia BIT, supra note 59, at art. 5(1); Cuba-Guatemala BIT, supra note 
61, at art. VI(1); Cuba-Peru BIT, supra note 77, at art. 5(1); Cuba-Germany BIT, 
supra note 77, at art. 4(2); Cuba-Portugal BIT, supra note 63, at art. 4(1); Cuba-
Spain BIT, supra note 64, at art. V(1); Cuba-Argentina BIT, supra note 67, at art. 
4(1); Cuba-Switzerland BIT, supra note 69, at art. 6(1); Cuba-Barbados BIT, su-
pra note 64, at art. 5(1); Cuba-Venezuela BIT, supra note 66, at art. 6(1); Cuba-
Hungary BIT, supra note 59, at art. 5(1). Other treaties simply state that “[i]nvest-
ment shall not be expropriated, nationalized or subject, directly or indirectly.” See 
Cuba-Turkey BIT, supra note 65, at art. III(1); Cuba-Austria BIT, supra note 57, 
at art. 5(1); Cuba-Italy BIT, supra note 70, at art. 5(2); Cuba-France BIT, supra 
note 68, at art. 5(2); Cuba-Mexico BIT, supra note 62, at art. 7; Cuba-Romania 
BIT, supra note 56, at art. 5(1); Cuba-Chile BIT, supra note 58, at art. 6(1); Cuba-
Bolivia BIT, supra note 61, at art. IV(1); Cuba-Vietnam BIT, supra note 64, at 
art. 5(2); Cuba-Lebanon BIT, supra note 60, at art. 4(2); Cuba-Netherlands BIT, 
supra note 54, at art. 6. 
 245 For a definition of indirect expropriation refer, for instance, to Starrett 
Housing Corporation v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Case No. 24, Interlocutory 
Award No. ITL 32-24-1, December 19, 1983, reprinted in 4 Iran-U.S. CTR 122, 
154 (“[I]t is recognized in international law that the measures taken by a state can 
interfere with property rights to such an extent that these rights are rendered so 
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G. Transfer of Funds 
The critical issue of revenue repatriation, so essential to the for-
eign investor’s short-term calculus, is amply addressed in Cuba’s 
BITs. Cuban repatriation clauses identify with specificity a non-ex-
haustive list of protected transfers under the relevant treaty. Article 
5 of the Cuba-Netherlands BIT, for instance, establishes that permit-
ted transfers, include, in particular, though not exclusively: 
(i) profits, interests, dividends and other current 
income; 
(ii) funds necessary for the acquisition of raw or 
auxiliary materials, semi-fabricated or finished prod-
ucts, or to replace capital assets in order to safeguard 
the continuity of an investment; 
(iii) additional funds necessary for the develop-
ment of an investment; 
(iv) funds in repayment of loans; 
(v) royalties or fees; 
(vi) earnings of expatriates working in connection 
with an investment; 
(vii) the proceeds of sale or liquidation of the in-
vestment; [and 
(viii) payments under the force majeure clause.246 
Doctrinally, the litmus test for determining what constitutes a 
permitted transfer necessarily entails an analysis of whether it is “es-
                                                                                                             
useless that they must be deemed to have been expropriated.”); see also L.E.S.I. 
SpA v. République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/3, Award, ¶ 131 (Nov. 12, 2008), available at http://icsidfiles.worl
dbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C48/DC890_Fr.pdf (“En droit in-
ternational, l’expropriation ne se limite pas à la confiscation de biens matériels . . . 
en certaines circonstances, résulter de la privation substantielle de droit contrac-
tuels. Ce type d’expropriation dite «indirecte» ou «rampante».”). 
 246 Cuba-Austria BIT, supra note 57, at art. 5(1). 
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sential for, or typical to the making, controlling, maintenance, dis-
position”247 of the investment. The threshold question, thus, hinges 
on whether the transfer is directly “related to the investment.”248 
The foreign investor’s repatriation rights, however, are not with-
out limits. In striking a delicate balance between Cuba’s (or the other 
contracting state’s)  “monetary sovereignty”249 and the foreign in-
vestors’ repatriation rights, Cuban treaties establish that transfers 
shall be made in convertible currency pursuant to the laws and reg-
ulations of the contracting state where the investment was made.250 
Arguably, little stands in the way of the Cuban Republic’s authority 
under its various BIT’s to, for instance, modify exchange rate regu-
lations and demand foreign investors get Central Bank authoriza-
tion, ex ante, as a precondition for repatriation.251 
This notwithstanding, Article VII(4) of the Cuba-Spain BIT ex-
plicitly limits the contracting states’ radius of action, mandating that 
no more than three months elapse between the time the foreign in-
vestor submits the transfer application and the time when the trans-
fer is actually made.252 Perhaps the Cuban-Peruvian repatriation 
clause brings to the fore, more vividly than most, the absence of 
                                                                                                             
 247 Continental Casualty Company v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/03/9, Award, ¶ 240 (Sept. 5, 2008), available at http://www.italaw.com
/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0228.pdf. 
 248 Id. 
 249 Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 213 (2d ed. 2012). 
 250 Emphasis added. See, e.g., Cuba-Romania BIT, supra note 56, at art. 4(3); 
Cuba-United Kingdom BIT, supra note 64, at art. 6; Cuba-Barbados BIT, supra 
note 64, at art. 6; Cuba-Guatemala BIT, supra note 61, at art. V(2); Cuba-Portugal 
BIT, supra note 63, at art. 6(2); Cuba-Argentina BIT, supra note 67, at art. 5(2); 
Cuba-Switzerland BIT, supra note 69, at art. 5(2); Cuba-Bolivia BIT, supra note 
61, at art. V(2); Cuba-Chile BIT, supra note 58, at art. 5(2); Cuba-France BIT, 
supra note 68, at art. 6; Cuba-Italy BIT, supra note 70, at art. 6; Cuba-Indonesia 
BIT, supra note 64, at art. VI(1); Cuba-Mexico BIT, supra note 62, at art. 6(2); 
Cuba-China BIT, supra note 134, at art. 6(1). 
 251 Refer to Metalpar S.A. and Buen Aire S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/5, Award, ¶ 179 (June 6, 2008), available at http://ww
w.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0516.pdf (“The Tribunal con-
cludes that Claimants, who knew the regulations on this matter well . . . did not 
comply with the established procedure, which consisted of requesting authoriza-
tion from the Central Bank . . . and that Argentina did not breach article 5(b) of 
the BIT.”). 
 252 Cuba-Spain BIT, supra note 64, at art. VII(4) 
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treaty homogeneity as regards transferability. Under Article 4(5) of 
the Cuba-Peru BIT,253 both contracting states have reserved their 
right to temporarily limit transfers in the face of a deficient balance 
of payments --- a prerogative not present in the text of the vast ma-
jority of Cuban BIT’s. 
H. The Umbrella Clause 
Such textual heterogeneity becomes even more accentuated with 
respect to the so-called umbrella clause. As a threshold matter, it is 
essential to note that not all Cuban BIT’s contain umbrella clauses. 
Under those Cuban BITs without umbrella clauses, the question 
of whether a purely contractual breach rises to the level of a treaty 
breach --- thus constituting a transgression of international law --- 
will depend on whether the foreign investor’s claim for breach of 
the BIT’s substantive protections arose out of a contractual 
breach.254 The above-referenced test appears to be inapplicable in 
the face of the typical Cuban umbrella clause, whereby the Cuban 
Republic is bound to observe any present or future legal obligation 
with regard to the investments covered by the BIT. Article 7(2) of 
the Cuba-Romania BIT is emblematic of the umbrella clause lan-
guage adopted by the Cuban Republic in its treaties with the United 
Kingdom,255 Germany,256 Austria,257 Lebanon,258 Greece,259 Vene-
zuela,260 Switzerland,261 and Barbados.262 
                                                                                                             
 253 Cuba-Peru BIT, supra note 77, at art. 4(5)The original Spanish version of 
this provision reads as follows, (“[C]ada Parte contratante tendrá derecho, en si-
tuaciones de dificultades excepcionales o graves de balanza de pagos, a limitar 
temporalmente las transferencias, en forma equitativa y no discriminatoria, de 
conformidad con los criterios internacionalmente aceptados.”). 
 254 Stanimir A. Alexandrov, Breaches of Contract and Breaches of Treaty – 
The Jurisdiction of Treaty-based Arbitration Tribunals to Decide Breach of Con-
tract Claims in SGS v. Pakistan and SGS v. Philippines, 5 THE JOURNAL OF 
WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 556, 561 (Aug. 2004). 
 255 Cuba-United Kingdom BIT, supra note 64, at art. 2(2). 
 256 Cuba-Germany BIT, supra note 77, at art. 8(2). 
 257 Cuba-Austria BIT, supra note 57, at art. 9. 
 258 Cuba-Lebanon BIT, supra note 60, at art. 9(2). 
 259 Cuba-Greece BIT, supra note 55, at art. 2(4). 
 260 Cuba-Venezuela BIT, supra note 66, at art. 4(5). 
 261 Cuba-Switzerland BIT, supra note 69, at art. 8(2). 
 262 Cuba-Barbados BIT, supra note 64, at art. 2(2). 
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Each Contracting Party shall observe any other obli-
gation it has assumed with regard to investments 
made in its territory by investors of the other Con-
tracting Party. 
Admittedly, given the dearth of investment treaty arbitrations in-
volving Cuba and the acute dissonance among international arbitral 
tribunals on their appropriate construction and application,263 the 
reach of Cuban umbrella clauses remains rather uncertain.264 
I. Inter-temporal Application 
Besides thoroughly understanding the substantive safeguards 
available to foreign investors under the wide universe of Cuban 
BIT’s, it is essential to closely scrutinize their inter-temporal appli-
cation. While clearly protecting foreign investments made on or af-
ter their date of effectiveness, Cuban BITs are also applicable to for-
eign investments legally existing in Cuba before their entry into 
force. Such is the case of Cuba’s BITs with, for instance, the Neth-
erlands,265 Slovakia,266 Greece,267 Lebanon,268 Argentina,269 
                                                                                                             
 263 The doctrinal divergence emerging in the wake of the jurisdictional awards 
in SGS Société Générale de Surveillance, S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, Decision on Jurisdiction, Aug. 6, 2003 and SGS So-
ciété Générale de Surveillance, S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/02/6, Decision on Jurisdiction, Jan. 29, 2004, has only widened in the 
ensuing years. 
 264 Even in the face of a Cuban BIT having no umbrella clause, an interna-
tional arbitral tribunal may very well find that by operation of that BIT’s MFN 
clause Cuba is “obliged to extend [that] same Treaty protection of contractual 
commitments” to the foreign investor of a contracting state with whom no um-
brella clause was agreed. See e.g. Impregilo, S.p.A. v. Islamic Republic of Paki-
stan, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/3, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 221 (Apr. 22, 2005), 
available at http:/icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C
224/DC642_En.pdf. 
 265 Cuba-Netherlands BIT, supra note 54, at art. 10. 
 266 Cuba-Slovakia BIT, supra note 59, at art. 11. 
 267 Cuba-Greece BIT, supra note 55, at art. 13. 
 268 Cuba-Lebanon BIT, supra note 60, at art. 10. 
 269 Cuba-Argentina BIT, supra note 67, at art. 1. 
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Chile,270 Hungary,271 Guatemala,272 Bolivia,273 Peru,274 Vene-
zuela,275 Switzerland,276 Romania,277 Portugal,278 Mexico,279 and 
Germany.280 Article 10 of the Cuba-Netherlands BIT neatly encap-
sulates this approach, 
The provisions of this Agreement shall, from the date 
of entry into force thereof, also apply to investments 
that legally exist on that date, but they shall not apply 
to investment disputes which arouse before its entry 
into force.281 
Thus, the exercise of identifying the precise point in time at 
which the legal dispute between the foreign investor and the Cuban 
Republic crystallized will become outcome–determinative with re-
spect to the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction ratione temporis. Interest-
ingly, Article 24(2) of the Cuba-Austria BIT offers the parties a 
more time- specific approach, denying coverage to “claims which 
have been settled or dispute procedures which have been initiated 
prior to its entry into force.”282 Other Cuban BITs, while extending 
coverage to foreign investments made before their entry into force, 
remain silent as to whether disputes existing prior to that date are 
                                                                                                             
 270 Cuba-Chile BIT, supra note 58, at art. 2. 
 271 Cuba-Hungary BIT, supra note 59, at art. 11. 
 272 Cuba-Guatemala BIT, supra note 61, at art. II. 
 273 Id. at art. X. 
 274 Cuba-Peru BIT, supra note 77, at art. 11. 
 275 Cuba-Venezuela BIT, supra note 66, at art. 2. 
 276 Agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the Republic of Cuba on 
the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments. Cuba-Switzerland BIT, 
supra note 69, at art. 2. 
 277 Cuba-Romania BIT, supra note 56, at, art. 6. 
 278 Cuba-Portugal BIT, supra note 63, at art. 11. 
 279 Cuba-Mexico BIT, supra note 62, at art. 2. 
 280 Cuba-Germany BIT, supra note 77, at art. 9. 
 281 Cuba-Netherlands BIT, supra note 54, at art. 10 (emphasis added). 
 282 Cuba-Austria BIT, supra note 57, at art. 24(2) (emphasis added). 
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covered or not under the BIT. Cuba’s BITs with, for example, Tur-
key,283 Vietnam,284 Spain,285 Italy,286 United Kingdom,287 Barba-
dos,288 Indonesia,289 and China,290 stand for this proposition. In par-
ticular, Article VIII(1) of the Cuba-Turkey BIT establishes in part 
that: 
This Agreement shall be applicable to the invest-
ments which are operating legally on the date of its 
entry into force as well as to investments made or ac-
quired thereafter.291 
Arguably, determining the retroactive reach of those BITs 
adopting the above-referenced language will no doubt befall on the 
international arbitral tribunal itself, as it carves out the metes and 
bounds of its own jurisdiction ratione temporis. Prospective protec-
tion, following termination, is yet an additional safeguard invariably 
present in Cuba’s BITs. Under an important number of these trea-
ties, foreign investments made on Cuban soil prior to the termination 
of the relevant BIT will “continue to be effective for a period of ten 
years from the date of termination.”292 This is true for Cuba’s BITs 
with, among others, Slovakia,293 Greece,294 Spain,295 Indonesia,296 
                                                                                                             
 283 Cuba-Turkey BIT, supra note 65, at art. VIII(1). 
 284 Cuba-Vietnam BIT, supra note 64, at art. 10. 
 285 Cuba-Spain BIT, supra note 64, at art. II(2). 
 286 Cuba-Italy BIT, supra note 70, at art. 13. 
 287 Cuba-United Kingdom BIT, supra note 64, at art. 13. 
 288 Cuba-Barbados BIT, supra note 64, at art. 12. 
 289 Cuba-Indonesia BIT, supra note 64, at art. X. 
 290 Cuba-China BIT, supra note 134, at art. 11. 
 291 Cuba-Turkey BIT, supra note 65, at art. VIII(1). 
 292 Cuba-Slovakia BIT, supra note 59, at art. 12(3) (emphasis added). 
 293 Id. 
 294 Cuba-Greece BIT, supra note 55, at art. 14(3). 
 295 Cuba-Spain BIT, supra note 64, at art. XII(2). 
 296 Cuba-Indonesia BIT, supra note 64, at art. XIII(2). 
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China,297 Hungary,298 Guatemala,299 Peru,300 Venezuela,301 Tur-
key,302 Austria,303 Portugal,304 Argentina,305 and Vietnam.306 
Likewise, Cuba’s BIT’s with Germany307 and Switzerland308 
provide identical post-termination protection but for a period of 20 
years following their expiration. The Cuban-Chilean309 and Cuban-
Dutch treaties,310 for example, limit such post-termination protec-
tion to 15 years, while the Cuban-Italian treaty311 further reduces it 
to a 5-year period. Under Cuba’s BITs with Romania,312 Bolivia,313 
and Lebanon,314 all of which offer post-termination protection,  the 
10-year period begins to run as of the date one of the contracting 
states to the BIT tenders an official notice denouncing the treaty. For 
their part, Cuba’s BITs with the United Kingdom,315 Barbados,316 
and France317 explicitly limit their 20-year post-termination protec-
tion only to those foreign investments made while the treaty was in 
force. The Cuba-Mexico BIT reproduces this same arrangement, but 
only with 10 years of post-termination protection.318 
It is not uncommon for Cuban BITs to enjoy terms of maturity 
of 10 or even 15 years,319 with the possibility of tacit extensions for 
                                                                                                             
 297 Cuba-China BIT, supra note 134, at art. 13(4). 
 298 Cuba-Hungary BIT, supra note 59, at art. 12(3). 
 299 Cuba-Guatemala BIT, supra note 61, at art. XI(3). 
 300 Cuba-Peru BIT, supra note 77, at art. 12(4). 
 301 Cuba-Venezuela BIT, supra note 66, at art. 11(3). 
 302 Cuba-Turkey BIT, supra note 65, at art. VIII(4). 
 303 Cuba-Austria BIT, supra note 57, at art. 26(3). 
 304 Cuba-Portugal BIT, supra note 63, at art. 13(3). 
 305 Cuba-Argentina BIT, supra note 67, at art. 10(2). 
 306 Cuba-Vietnam BIT, supra note 64, at art. 12(3). 
 307 Cuba-Germany BIT, supra note 77, at art. 13(3). 
 308 Cuba-Switzerland BIT, supra note 69, at art. 13(2). 
 309 Cuba-Chile BIT, supra note 58, at art. 11(3). 
 310 Cuba-Netherlands BIT, supra note 54, at art. 14(3). 
 311 Cuba-Italy BIT, supra note 70, at art. 15(2). 
 312 Cuba-Romania BIT, supra note 56, at art. 11(2). 
 313 Cuba-Bolivia BIT, supra note 61, at art. XII(3). 
 314 Cuba-Lebanon BIT, supra note 60, at art. 12(2). 
 315 Cuba-United Kingdom BIT, supra note 64, at art. 14. 
 316 Cuba-Barbados BIT, supra note 64, at art. 13. 
 317 Cuba-France BIT, supra note 68, at art. 12. 
 318 Cuba-Mexico BIT, supra note 62, at art. 14(3). 
 319 For BIT’s enjoying terms of maturity of ten years see, e.g., Cuba-Vene-
zuela BIT, supra note 66, at art. 11(2); Cuba-Hungary BIT, supra note 59, at art. 
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periods of two,320 five,321 or even 10 years,322 unless denounced 
within one-year323 or six months324 of their expiration dates. Cuban 
BITs, moreover, will usually enter into full force and effect follow-
ing the exchange of ratification instruments between the Cuban Re-
public and the other contracting state, in accordance with their re-
spective domestic legislations. 
                                                                                                             
12(2); Cuba-Mexico BIT, supra note 62, at art. 14(1); Cuba-Guatemala BIT, su-
pra note 61, at art. XI(2); Cuba-Austria BIT, supra note 57, at art. 26(2); Cuba-
Peru BIT, supra note 77, at art. 12(2); Cuba-Lebanon BIT, supra note 60, at art. 
12(1); Cuba-Indonesia BIT, supra note 64, at art. 13(1); Cuba-Turkey BIT, supra 
note 65, at art. VIII(2); Cuba-France BIT, supra note 68, at art. 12; Cuba-Portugal 
BIT, supra note 63, at art. 13(2); Cuba-Barbados BIT, supra note 64, at art. 13; 
Cuba-Bolivia BIT, supra note 61, at art. XII(2); Cuba-Germany BIT, supra note 
77, at art. 13(2); Cuba-Romania BIT, supra note 56, at art. 11(1); Cuba-United 
Kingdom BIT, supra note 64, at art. 14; Cuba-Argentina BIT, supra note 67, at 
art. 10(1); Cuba-Greece BIT, supra note 55, at art. 14(1); Cuba-Switzerland BIT, 
supra note 69, at art. 13(1); Cuba-Slovakia BIT, supra note 59, at art. 12(2); Cuba-
Vietnam BIT, supra note 64, at art. 12(1); Cuba-Spain BIT, supra note 64, at art. 
XII(1); Cuba-Italy BIT, supra note 70, at art. 15(1). For BITs with terms of ma-
turity of 15 years see, e.g., Cuba-Netherlands BIT, supra note 54, at art. 14(1); 
Cuba-Chile BIT, supra note 58, at art. 11(2). 
 320 See Cuba-Spain BIT, supra note 64, at art. XII(1). 
 321 See,e.g., Cuba-Vietnam BIT, supra note 64, at art. 12(1); Cuba-Italy BIT, 
supra note 70, at art. 15(1). 
 322 See, e.g., Cuba-Indonesia BIT, supra note 64, at art. 13(1); Cuba-Bolivia 
BIT, supra note 61, at art. XII(2); Cuba-Romania BIT, supra note 56, at art. 11(1); 
Cuba-Greece BIT, supra note 55, at art. 14(2); Cuba-Slovakia BIT, supra note 59, 
at art. 12(2). 
 323 See, e.g., Cuba-Venezuela BIT, supra note 66, at art. 11(2); Cuba-Hungary 
BIT, supra note 59, at art. 12(2); Cuba-Mexico BIT, supra note 62, at art. 14(2); 
Cuba-Chile BIT, supra note 58, at art. 11(2); Cuba-Lebanon BIT, supra note 60, 
at art. 12(1); Cuba-Indonesia BIT, supra note 64, at art. 13(1); Cuba-Turkey BIT, 
supra note 65, at art. VIII(2); Cuba-Portugal BIT, supra note 63, at art. 13(2); 
Cuba-Barbados BIT, supra note 64, at art. 13; Cuba-Germany BIT, supra note 77, 
at art. 13(2); Cuba- United Kingdom BIT, supra note 64, at art. 14; Cuba-Argen-
tina BIT, supra note 67, at art. 10(1); Cuba-Switzerland BIT, supra note 69, at art. 
13(1); Cuba-Slovakia BIT, supra note 59, at art. 12(2); Cuba-Italy BIT, supra 
note 70, at art. 15(1). 
 324 See, e.g., Cuba-Netherlands BIT, supra note 54, at art. 14(2); Cuba-Peru 
BIT, supra note 77, at art. 12(2); Cuba-Romania BIT, supra note 56, at art. 11(1); 
Cuba-Greece BIT, supra note 55, at art. 14(2); Cuba-Vietnam BIT, supra note 64, 
at art. 12(2). 
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V. CONCLUSION: A LEGAL MINEFIELD? 
As Cuba navigates along uncharted waters, its capacity to attract 
significant inflows of DFI will prove decisive. 
For Cuba, there will be no sustainability without robust eco-
nomic growth. In the Cuban context, however, this necessarily re-
quires the restructuring of the island’s institutional repertoire. 
More specifically, Cuba’s ability to attract and preserve high 
volumes of DFI is closely intertwined to the island’s willingness to 
delocalize the dispute settlement mechanisms available to foreign 
investors doing business in Cuban territory. 
The cogency of its domestic legal superstructure and, more im-
portantly, the degree to which its domestic legal order can coher-
ently interact with the international legal order will no doubt prove 
decisive in attracting DFI. 
For Cuba, however, the future still looks rather uncertain.  Be-
sides the obvious complexities surrounding the deconstruction of the 
United States’ anachronistic blockade, Cuba faces today a myriad of 
unanswered questions and tough policy options. 
And among the more prominent policy choices facing the Cuban 
Republic, in its quest to woo foreign investment, is deciding whether 
to open itself fully to investment treaty arbitration. 
On the one hand, Cuba’s signing of a wide universe of BITs with 
countries from around the globe, if taken together with its ratifica-
tion of the New York Convention and Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, goes to show a long-standing pro international ar-
bitration policy that predates today’s geopolitical juncture. 
Yet, on the other hand, the very small number of investment 
treaty arbitrations involving Cuba together with the policy and legal 
imponderables surrounding the island’s endogenous institutional 
repertoire, bring to the surface the long road ahead for solidifying 
the hold of international arbitration in Cuba’s legal culture. 
The first challenge facing investment treaty arbitration in Cuba 
is the uncertain status of treaties in Cuba’s domestic law. Admit-
tedly, Article 20 of the Cuban Civil Code325 establishes that in the 
case of conflict between a treaty and a provision of the Civil Code, 
                                                                                                             
 325 CÓD CIV. art. 20 (Cuba)(“Si un acuerdo o un tratado internacional del que 
Cuba sea parte establece reglas diferentes a las expresadas en los artículos ante-
riores o no contenida en ellos, se aplican las reglas de dicho acuerdo o tratado.”). 
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the treaty controls. This notwithstanding, it is not at all clear in the 
Cuban Constitution or in Decree-Law No. 191 of 1999326 how and 
when treaties become a part of Cuban domestic law or their hierar-
chy relative to domestic legislation. While obviously not a monist 
state in the Dutch sense,327 the Cuban Republic has yet to articulate 
with greater clarity a rule of treaty transubstantiation into domestic 
law. 
Arguably, the second challenge besieging investment treaty ar-
bitration in Cuba is the uncertainty surrounding the almost inevita-
ble interactions between the Cuban and international legal orders; 
particularly in the context of parallel proceedings. 
The recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards in Cuba will, 
no doubt, raise complex legal and policy questions in Cuban courts 
in light of Havana’s disavowal of the ICSID Convention and the 
New York Convention’s escape hatches. 
Amidst the uncertainty, however, it is a foregone conclusion that 
Cuba’s legal superstructure will undergo important transformations 
as it attempts to cope with ever- higher volumes of DFI. Sustaina-
bility hinges on the Cuban Republic’s willingness to fully incorpo-
rate itself to the global markets. At a time when Washington and 
Havana attempt to chart a new geopolitical understanding that will 
no doubt test the vitality of Cuba’s BITs, no other aspect of Cuban 
foreign investment law is as pertinent as its dispute settlement mech-
anisms. On their cogency, coherence, and predictability (or lack 
thereof), depends in great measure the survival of the Cuban na-
tional project. 
Time is of the essence. 
 
                                                                                                             
 326 Published in the Official Gazette of the Cuban Republic on March 12, 
1999, Decree-Law No. 191 stands today as the definitive norm regulating the Cu-
ban Republic’s accession to bilateral and multilateral treaties. 
 327 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS Sept. 22, 
2008, art. 91(3) (“Any provision of a treaty that conflicts with the Constitution or 
which leads to conflicts with it may be approved by the Houses of the States Gen-
eral only if at least two-thirds of the votes cast are in favor.”) The Cuban Consti-
tution, contrary to its Dutch counterpart, is clearly the supreme legal norm in Cu-
ban territory and controls over all else, including treaties. 
